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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Due to the widespread advance of technology, an increasing number of 
multinational corporations, cross-border competition for capital, and the development of 
interconnected accounting regulations worldwide, comparable and transparent financial 
information is becoming an increasingly important issue.  Recently there have been 
considerable efforts to achieve international convergence of accounting standards by 
reducing cross-country differences in accounting practice.  Among the efforts of 
harmonizing international accounting standards, the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) has played a leading role.1  The International Accounting Standards 
Committee actively pursued the goal of international accounting harmonization for two 
decades, and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) published by the IASB 
are recognized as global standards.2  
                                               
1
 “Harmonization is a process of increasing the compatibility of accounting practices by setting limits on 
how much they can vary” (Choi and Meek, 2005, p.275.) Harmonized standards are not necessarily one-
fits-all standards but improve the comparability of financial information from different countries.  
Convergence is a process of gradually eliminating differences in accounting standards through the 
cooperative efforts of the IASB, standard setters, and other regulators. The notions behind harmonization 
and convergence are closely aligned. However, harmonization is generally taken to mean the elimination of 
differences in existing accounting standards while convergence might also involve coming up with a new 
accounting treatment not in any current standard. 
  
2
 Accounting standards issued by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) are called 
International Accounting Standards (IAS), while those issued by the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) are called International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). In 2001, the IASB succeeded 
the IASC, and IFRS included all previously issued IAS. The use of IAS or IFRS in this dissertation is 
consistent with the particular article cited.  
 2 
All European Union (EU) listed companies follow IFRS in their consolidated 
financial statements starting in 2005.  Also, Canada and many Asia-Pacific countries are 
taking various approaches toward convergence of their domestic generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) with IFRS.  Australia and New Zealand adopted IFRS as 
their own GAAP in 2005.  The United States is not an exception in converging its 
accounting standards with IFRS.  The IASB and US Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) have launched a joint program to converge US and international 
accounting standards to the maximum extent possible.  Choi and Meek (2005, p.279) 
state that increasing numbers of countries now allow companies to base their financial 
statements on IFRS and some require it.  
These countries seek several benefits from global accounting standards.  Investors 
in these countries go to international markets in order to take advantage of capital 
investment opportunities.  International investors require comparable financial statements 
because financial statements prepared with different accounting principles impede good 
international investment decision-making.  Therefore, harmonized global accounting 
principles should enable international investors to make better investment decisions, and 
good investment decisions lead to the efficient allocation of capital.  Portfolios are more 
diverse and financial risk is reduced.  Improved allocation of capital makes countries 
better off (Choi and Meek 2005; Entwistle et al. 2005.)  Because of these benefits, cross-
country differences in accounting practices are being reduced.  Land and Lang (2002) 
document that cross-country accounting differences have been significantly reduced in 
the seven countries they examine.   
 3 
However, differences still remain, and these differences create problems of 
misunderstanding, inefficiencies, and uncertainties to participants in the world’s capital 
markets (Chamisa 2000.)  Also, there are some criticisms of harmonized international 
standards.  Some observers state that a single set of converged accounting standards 
cannot satisfy the information needs of internal and external users of companies and be 
consistently complied with in a diverse global environment (Ball 1995; Carlson 1997; 
Bradshaw and Miller 2002.)  Barth et al. (1999) show that harmonizing domestic GAAP 
with foreign GAAP can have negative effects on security market performance, 
specifically price informativeness and trading volume.  In the end, accounting 
convergence and the impact of convergence are empirical questions.   
The main research question in this study is whether or not convergence of 
accounting standards improves financial reporting quality3.  This study focuses on (1) 
whether cross-country differences in accounting are reduced and, if so, (2) how 
accounting convergence affects accounting quality.  These questions are motivated by the 
assertion that comparable financial statements lead to the efficient allocation of resources.  
If accounting standards are converged, investors have more comparable financial 
statements.  Comparable financial statements allow investors to make better decisions in 
allocating their resources.  If investors can efficiently allocate resources based on 
financial statements, then the financial statements can be viewed as having high quality.   
                                               
3
 Financial reporting quality does not have a precise definition. In the literature, financial reporting quality 
is generally defined as the extent to which reported earnings in financial statements faithfully represent 
underlying economic constructs and as the degree to which reported earnings reflect basic accounting 
concepts.  
 
 4 
The primary purpose of this study is to empirically examine the functional 
relationship between convergence and financial reporting quality.  This study measures 
cross-country accounting differences by the extent to which each year / country earnings 
multiples are narrowing down to the mean adjusted earnings multiples over the sample 
periods and countries,4 and measures earnings quality of the sample countries for each 
year in terms of (1) accrual quality, (2) persistence, (3) predictability, (4) smoothness, (5) 
reliability, (6) relevance, (7) timeliness, and (8) conservatism.   
This research differs from prior research in the following ways.  First, previous 
international convergence studies focus on comparing a limited number of domestic 
GAAPs and IAS, but this study compares accounting differences in as many countries as 
data are allowed using mean-adjusted earnings multiples.  Second, the indexation 
approach proposed by van der Tas (1988) is commonly used to measure international 
accounting harmonization, but this approach allows comparing accounting differences in 
only several particular selected financial statement items.  However, this study examines 
whether or not cross-country differences in all accounting practices are reduced by using 
earnings multiples as a key summary measure of accounting practices.  Therefore it 
explores a general trend toward accounting convergence rather than focusing on specific 
financial statement items.  Third, many studies consider the date of IFRS adoption as 
evidence of accounting convergence.  However, if the adoption of IFRS is used as a 
significant change event that demarcates before and after convergence, it is difficult to 
observe accounting quality changes after convergence.  Because many countries have just 
                                               
4
 This study follows Land and Lang (2002) and primarily focuses on earnings multiples to measure 
accounting convergence because earnings is a key summary performance measurement in all countries and 
earnings should be strongly affected by changes in accounting practice.   
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recently adopted IFRS (and others have not adopted them yet), there is limited data 
availability for the post-adoption periods.  Therefore, this study examines the gradual 
changes in convergence and changes in accounting quality over a seven year period and 
tests the association between these two.  Finally, no previous studies examine accounting 
quality improvement as a benefit of accounting convergence.  This research examines 
quality improvement as evidence of a potential benefit of accounting convergence.   
This study contributes to the extant accounting literature in two ways.  First, it 
contributes to the literature on international accounting convergence (e.g., Murphy 1999; 
El-Gazzar et al. 1999; Ashbaugh 2001.)  Prior research has not investigated whether 
earnings quality is a function of accounting convergence.  To my knowledge, this paper is 
the first attempt to explore the functional relationship between earnings quality and 
convergence and thereby provide evidence on this potential benefit of accounting 
standards convergence.  In addition, this study extends the international harmonization 
literature (e.g., Joos and Lang 1994; Herrmann and Thomas 1995; Street et al. 2000; 
Land and Lang 2002) by providing evidence of accounting convergence covering more 
countries with more recent data.  Finally, the results from this study have implications for 
investors and standard setters in enhancing their understanding of accounting 
convergence and its impact on the quality of accounting.   
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter II reviews the 
related literature and states alternative hypothesis.  Chapter III describes the sample 
selection and research methodology and Chapter IV presents the empirical results.  
Finally, Chapter V offers concluding remarks, limitations, and suggestions for future 
research. 
 6 
CHAPTER II 
 
 
PRIOR RESEARCH 
1. Research on international accounting convergence 
A study by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) emphasized the 
importance of internationally comparable accounting standards by saying the following: 
Global competition has led many firms to look increasingly to new 
investor markets to finance the expansion and modernization needed to keep pace 
and advance in world markets.  Likewise, investors look increasingly to other 
countries to broaden their investment opportunities and diversify risks.  As a 
result, the need for internationally comparable financial statements and, therefore, 
internationally comparable accounting standards, has never been greater. (FASB, 
1996, p.3)    
Much of the prior research focuses on whether adopting internationally converged 
accounting standards results in bringing firms a net benefit or cost.  Murphy (1999) 
documents the benefits from increased comparability of financial statements.  He shows 
that Swiss firms adopting IAS have a statistically significant increase in foreign activity, 
foreign exchange listings, and foreign sales compared to non-IAS adopting Swiss firms.  
El-Gazzar et al. (1999) examine what kinds of firms are voluntarily complying with IAS.  
They find that firms with a higher percentage of total revenue derived from foreign sales, 
firms with listings on multiple foreign stock exchanges, and firms with lower debt ratios 
are more motivated to adhere to IAS in their financial statements.  This, in turn, would be 
 7 
evidence that firms complying with IAS benefit from more sales from foreign 
transactions and lower debt ratios, and the market places significant value on the adoption 
of a universally accepted set of accounting standards.  Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) show 
that analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy increased in the post-IAS adoption period.  
Ashbaugh (2001) also finds that non-US firms are more likely to report IAS financial 
information when their shares trade in more equity markets.  This result suggests that 
non-US firms reporting IAS financial information receive some benefits from providing 
IAS financial information. 
In contrast, there are other studies suggesting that the harmonization of 
international accounting standards is not good.  Barth et al. (1999) show analytically that 
the cost of capital increases as harmonization increases, therefore harmonization can 
harm firm’s securities market performance.  Stolowy et al. (2001) document that the 
accounting treatment of intangible assets is different from country to country, and they 
illustrate how adopting a single set of accounting standards is harmful and international 
standards harmonization is difficult.  Kirby (2001) uses a stochastic oligopoly model of 
two firms in two countries, and analytically examines the consequences of international 
accounting harmonization at the disclosure level.  He observes that “countries are not 
unambiguously better off” if their companies are moving toward full disclosure, and the 
effects of harmonization on full disclosure levels depends on the country’s degree of 
development.  In particular, developing countries harmonizing on full disclosure are at 
greatest risk of experiencing detrimental side effects.  Ball (1995) also states “accounting 
is an integral part of each country’s own economic and political institutions,” therefore 
accounting standards are different across countries and it does not make sense to adopt a 
 8 
single set of accounting practices when the ways to use accounting information vary from 
country to country.  Moreover, whether harmonization of accounting standards results in 
comparable application of the standards is still in debate.  Street et al. (1999) investigate 
accounting compliance of companies claiming to comply with IAS and empirically find 
significant noncompliance with IAS.  More than half of sample companies comply with 
IAS with some limited exceptions and do not comply with all of the requirements of IAS.  
This finding suggests that accounting standard harmonization does not necessarily 
enhance comparability of accounting information.     
As mentioned above, there are advantages and disadvantages of accounting 
convergence.  This study examines whether accounting quality improvement is a benefit 
of accounting convergence.   
This study first examines whether or not accounting practices have converged 
over time.  Several studies explain how domestic GAAP differs from IAS and why they 
are different.  Harris (1995) determines the significance of differences between 1994 
IASC standards and US GAAP.  Street et al. (2000) show the differences between US 
GAAP and IASC GAAP for several accounting items.  Cairns and Nobes (2000) compare 
the accounting requirements for UK GAAP with the requirements of IASs.  Several 
international accounting firms conducted the study “GAAP 2001” (Nobes 2001), 
comparing cross-country differences in accounting and financial reporting issues in 62 
countries.  Ding et al. (2005) develop a divergence index (national GAAP and IAS 
prescribe different accounting methods) and absence index (national GAAP do not cover 
IAS accounting issue) for each of 52 countries, and show national GAAPs are, indeed, 
different from IAS.  These approaches are good at comparing cross-country accounting 
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differences in depth, but they only show how accounting practices are different.  It is hard 
to summarize these differences into one convergence measure and to assess whether or 
not the differences are reduced over time.  
Some prior research has examined international accounting convergence using 
analytical approaches.  Archer et al. (1996) develop 6 statistical models, compute the 
expected distribution of accounting policy choice for each model, and compare the 
estimated distribution to the observed distribution of accounting policy choice in each 
country.  They apply these models to two areas of accounting policy choice, deferred tax 
and consolidated goodwill, to determine international harmonization.  They find that 
comparability increases when the choices made by companies converge towards a 
generally accepted method or when the number of accounting methods in use is reduced.  
Garrido et al. (2002) also adopt an analytical model to measure harmonization progress.  
They compare three harmonization periods – referred to as A, B, and C – and define 
vectors of each period and alternative combinations of accounting treatments by counting 
the number of accounting methods for each alternative.  They find that harmonization 
progress is significantly advanced from Stages A to B and Stages B to C.5  Several 
researchers test international accounting harmonization with empirical data.  Murphy 
                                               
5
 Three harmonization stages are A: flexible standards (1973-1988), B: higher degree of comparability 
(1989-1995), and C: ideal harmonization periods (1996-onwards). Each stage has 4 alternative accounting 
treatments (required, benchmark, allowed, and forbidden.) The vectors of each stage and alternative 
combinations are composed for each of 20 accounting concepts (12 Balance Sheet concepts and 8 Income 
Statement concepts) by counting the number of accounting methods for each alternative. For more 
information, see Garrido et al. (2002) 
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(2000) adopts van der Tas’s (1988) I index6 and examines accounting harmonization after 
the adoption of IASs, in terms of 4 accounting practices: depreciation, inventory, 
financial statement cost basis, and consolidation practices.  He finds that harmonization 
has occurred over pre- and post-IASs periods but there is little evidence that these 
changes are the result of using IASs.  Herrmann and Thomas (1995) also use this 
technique to determine the harmonization in 9 accounting practices in the European 
Community and find that 6 of them are not harmonized.  Street et al. (2000) document the 
differences between US GAAP and IAS, and also develop the comparability index 
between these two standards.  They show that the impact of accounting differences 
between IASs and US GAAP has been narrowing over 1995-1997 periods.   
Both the analytical approaches and empirical studies mentioned above are useful 
ways to measure the decreases in accounting differences over time.  However, they also 
have the disadvantage that the number of countries or number of accounting methods 
being compared is limited.  Therefore, this dissertation follows Land and Lang (2002) 
and measures accounting convergence using earnings multiples.  Earnings are strongly 
affected by changes in accounting practice, thus it is a useful summary measure of 
convergence reflecting all changes in accounting practices.  Many countries can also be 
compared at once.  
Joos and Lang (1994) first use this technique to measure accounting diversity and 
uniformity.  They find that the significant differences in financial ratios and stock market 
                                               
6
  The I index measures the level of comparability for accounting practices used by companies from across 
countries. Two-country model I index is ∑
=
n
i
ii ff
1
21 )( . For example, if 80 percent of the companies in 
country 1 use method A and 20 percent use method B and if 70 percent of the companies in country 2 use 
method A and 30 percent use method B, the I index will equal 0.6200 [(0.80×0.70)+(0.20×0.30)=0.6200]. 
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valuation of accounting data (including return on equity, earnings per price ratio, and 
book to market ratio) still exist in EU countries over 1982-1990 periods despite EU 
harmonization efforts.  Land and Lang (2002) also show that the deviation in earnings 
multiples for sample firms from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States is getting smaller over the two periods of 1987-1992 and 
1994-1999.   
In summary, international accounting harmonization and comparability of 
accounting information is an important issue to be addressed.  Previous studies document 
advantages and disadvantages of accounting convergence, and these literatures motivate 
me to examine how (or if) international accounting convergence is related to an 
improvement in accounting information quality.  The first question to be examined is 
whether international accounting has converged over time, and to answer to this, the 
study adopts Land and Lang’s (2002) E/P ratios approach because this approach allows a 
comparison of differences across many countries and many accounting practices at a 
given point in time.    
  
2. Research on accounting quality 
“Earnings quality”, more generally, financial reporting quality does not have a 
precise definition.  Financial reporting quality is defined as the extent to which reported 
earnings faithfully represent underlying economic constructs and as the degree to which 
reported earnings reflect basic accounting concepts.  Prior research has evaluated 
earnings quality in many different ways.  Recent studies measuring earnings quality 
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summarize eight attributes of earnings, which are accrual quality, persistence, 
predictability, smoothness, reliability, relevance, timeliness, and conservatism (Francis et 
al. 2004; Biddle and Hilary 2006; Wang 2006.)  They view these attributes as the criteria 
for assessing accounting quality.  
 
(1) Accrual quality  
Richardson (2003) believes that a key measure of earnings quality is the deviation 
of net income from operating cash flows and measures earnings quality using accruals.  
Dechow (1994) states that understanding the role of accruals in producing earnings as 
one of the key outputs of the accounting process is important because earnings will 
become a less reliable measure of firm performance (and thereby of low quality) if 
management uses its discretion and opportunistically manipulates accruals.  Myers et al. 
(2003) use abnormal accruals and absolute current accruals as proxies for earnings 
quality.  Aboody et al. (2005) also measure earnings quality using abnormal accruals and 
working capital accruals, and find evidence that the stock market prices these earnings 
quality factors.  Ball and Shivakumar (2006) view accruals and earnings quality as related 
and they state that transitory changes in operating cash flow occur because managerial 
manipulation causes working capital items to vary in time, and thereby lead to lower 
earnings quality.   
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(2) Persistence and Predictability  
Penman and Zhang (2002), and Beneish and Vargus (2002) state that current 
earnings should be a good indicator of future earnings, and define earnings quality as the 
likelihood that a firm can have current earnings persist in the future.  Bricker et al. (1995) 
and Mikhail et al. (2003) define a good earnings quality as high predictive ability of 
future earnings.  Revsine et al. (1999) and Bodie et al. (2002) consider more persistent 
earnings to be of higher quality, and show the interrelationship between persistence, 
accruals, and quality by stating that low levels of accruals result in higher persistence of 
earnings, thereby resulting in higher quality.  
 
(3) Smoothness 
Lang et al. (2003) and Biddle and Hilary (2006) measure earnings smoothing as 
the cross-sectional correlation between the change in accruals and the change in cash 
flows, and state that a greater degree of earnings smoothing represents lower quality 
accounting.  Leuz et al. (2003) also use the same smoothing measure as a proxy for 
earnings management and find that earnings management is negatively associated with 
the quality of shareholder rights, legal enforcement, and quality financial reporting.       
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(4) Reliability and Relevance 
The Conceptual Framework focuses on decision usefulness and defines reliability 
as a criterion for measuring quality.  High quality earnings supports the objective of the 
Conceptual Framework in providing useful information such as a firm’s performance to 
financial accounting users.  The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have a joint project to converge their 
conceptual frameworks, and they specifically state that this project “involves 
consideration of the objectives of financial reporting and the qualitative characteristics of 
financial reporting information,” and that “general purpose financial reporting should 
provide information about the entity to the external users who lack the power to prescribe 
the information they require and therefore must rely on the information provided by an 
entity’s management.”7  Their discussion paper states that faithful representation 
(formerly reliability) of real-world economic phenomena is an essential qualitative 
characteristic.  According to the paper, representations are faithful when “there is 
correspondence or agreement between the accounting measures or descriptions in the 
financial reports and the economic phenomena they purport to represent.”8   
Maines and Wahlen (2006) suggest that earnings management (the relation of 
reported earnings with true earnings) can provide indirect evidence on reliable (faithful 
representation) financial reporting in terms of measurement error, freedom from bias, and 
incentives to managers and statement preparers for manipulating accounting income 
                                               
7
 For more information, see FASB website at http://www.fasb.org/project/conceptual_framework.shtml. 
 
8
 International Accounting Standards Board. July 2006. Discussion paper, Preliminary Views on an 
improved Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting: The Objective of Financial Reporting and 
Qualitative Characteristics of Decision-useful Financial Reporting Information. p.14.  
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(neutrality).  The association of stock prices and returns with accounting earnings can be 
also examined as a representational faithfulness measure (Maines and Wahlen 2006; 
Lang et al. 2003).  The extent to which the accounting represents the underlying 
economic event can be examined by testing the relation between stock returns (a proxy 
for economic gains and losses) and accounting earnings (a proxy for accounting gains 
and losses). 
 
(5) Timeliness and Conservatism   
Levitt, the former chairman of the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
emphasizes accounting standards focusing on transparency by stating that “for 
international standards to gain acceptance they must be of high quality – they must result 
in comparability and transparency.  International accounting standards must provide for 
full and fair disclosure.” (Levitt 1998)  He views transparency as an essential attribute of 
quality earnings.  Hunton et al. (2006) indicate that greater transparency in reporting 
requirements facilitates the detection of earnings management, and results in reduction in 
earnings management and high quality earnings.   
Ball et al. (2000) believe that timeliness and conservatism together capture 
transparency.  However, there is a controversy regarding reported earnings quality under 
conservative accounting practices.  Sen (2005) believes that the continued practice of 
conservatism may reduce the predictability and thus the quality of reported earnings 
because it creates a hidden reserve that can inflate future earnings when investment 
growth slows down.  Ball et al. (2000) believe that conservative accounting practice 
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makes optimistic non-accounting information released by managers less credible to 
uninformed users and facilitates monitoring of managers and of debt and other contracts, 
thus is an important feature of corporate governance.  However, since asymmetric and 
timely loss recognition is an empirically significant property of accounting earnings and 
has long-standing influence on practice (Ball and Shivakumar 2005), this study will view 
timely loss recognition and conservatism as desirable quality attributes.               
In summary, there is neither an agreed-upon meaning nor a generally accepted 
approach to measure earnings quality.  The attributes of earnings quality mentioned 
above may be mutually inconsistent or overlapping and they are not separately measured.  
These attributes are all intertwined.  Revsine et al. (1999) and Bodie et al. (2002) state 
that low levels of accruals result in the higher persistence and predictability of earnings.  
Studies such as Leuz et al. (2003), Lang et al. (2003), and Dechow (1994) measure 
earnings management using accruals and smoothness.  Hodge (2003) explores that more 
managed earnings do not faithfully represent true economic earnings and thus result in 
less value relevance of financial information.  Hunton et al. (2006) indicate that greater 
transparency reduces earnings management, and Ball et al. (2000) believe that 
transparency can be captured by timeliness and conservatism.  Therefore, this study uses 
multiple measures of accounting quality. 
 
3. A linkage between accounting convergence and accounting quality 
 Land and Lang (2002) document several reasons to expect cross-country 
harmonization of accounting.  Worldwide organizations, such as the International 
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Accounting Standards Board, have made significant efforts to reduce accounting 
differences and develop consistent regulation, and many countries have already adopted 
these standards or have plans to adopt them soon.  Moreover, cross-listing for capital 
markets creates incentives to converge accounting standards.  Therefore, I expect that 
accounting differences, as reflected in differences in earnings multiples, have decreased 
over time.   
 If cross-country accounting differences are reduced and accounting standards are 
converged, there should be an effect on the quality of earnings.  Accounting method 
choices affect the quality of accounting (Teets 2002) and there are studies showing that 
accounting standards choices are associated with accounting quality (Lang et al. 2003 and 
Barth et al. 2006).  Since the quality of earnings is closely related to management’s 
choice of accounting methods (Teets 2002), accounting standards convergence must have 
some impact on financial reporting quality.   
 On the one hand, Stolowy et al. (2001) illustrate how adopting a single set of 
accounting standards is harmful and international standards harmonization is difficult.  
Kirby (2001) examines the consequences of international accounting harmonization at the 
disclosure level and observes that “countries are not unambiguously better off” if 
companies are moving toward full disclosure.  Street et al. (1999) state that accounting 
harmonization does not necessarily enhance comparability of accounting information.    
 On the other hand, Choi and Meek (2005) and Entwistle et al. (2005) argue that 
accounting harmonization will lead to good investment decisions and increase 
allocational efficiency of capital.  Financial statements allowing efficient resource 
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allocation can be viewed as having high quality, and convergence is expected to enhance 
accounting quality.  Land and Lang (2002) also view that more internationally consistent 
accounting practice can result in high quality accounting.  Therefore, the hypothesis of 
this study is developed related to the linkage between accounting convergence and 
accounting quality, and the alternative form of the hypothesis is that continuation of 
moving toward international norms and accounting convergence result in higher-quality 
accounting earnings. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Sample and Data 
  This study selects all firm-year observations in all countries that have the required 
financial data to estimate each empirical model in this study.  All data are from the 
Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial file and the Compustat Global Issues file 
containing stock market related items for the fiscal years from 1997 to 2006.  This study 
restricts the sample periods to 1999 – 20059, and the samples to industrial and 
commercial firms and excludes financial companies.  A total of 63 countries are available 
in Global Compustat.  22 countries are eliminated because they have fewer than 100 
firm-year observations, leaving a final sample of 41 countries.  Table 1 presents the firm-
year observations by sample countries.  
 
2. Accounting quality measures 
 Similar to Francis et al. (2004), Biddle and Hilary (2006), and Wang (2006), this 
study uses eight summary measures of accounting quality: (1) accrual quality, (2)
                                               
9
 To examine accrual quality, for example changes in cash flow from operation, data two years before and 
one year after sample period data are required.  
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earnings persistence, (3) predictability, (4) smoothness, (5) reliability, (6) relevance, (7) 
timeliness, and (8) conservatism.10    
 
(1) Accrual quality 
 This study employs Dechow and Dichev (2002)’s accrual quality measurement.  
The underlying rationale behind this measurement is that non-discretionary current 
accruals in the current period tend to be related to cash flows in the current period, the 
period preceding it, and in the period immediately following it.  Therefore, the 
discretionary part of current accruals can be estimated as the residual ( tj ,ε ) from the 
following regression:  
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Where:  
 tjTCA ,    =  Firm j’s total current accruals in year t. It is calculated as: 
( Δ total current assets - Δ cash) – ( Δ total current liabilities - 
Δ short-term debt - Δ taxes payable) – depreciation expense. 
 tjAssets ,  = Firm j’s total assets at the end of the year t.  
tjCFO ,   =  Firm j’s cash flow from operations in year t from the statement 
of cash flows. If a firm does not disclose this amount in the 
statement of cash flows, it is calculated as: operating income – 
accruals. 
                                               
10
 These measurements are also similar to the measures that Lang et al. (2003) and Barth et al. (2006) used 
in their papers to test accounting quality in an international setting.  
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  The standard deviation of residuals ( tj ,ε ) from Equation (1) can be used as a 
measure of accrual quality for each country and each year, and small values of the 
residual correspond to higher accruals quality and higher accounting quality.       
 
(2) Earnings persistence 
 Following Kormendi and Lipe (1987) and Francis et al. (2004), this study 
measures earnings persistence using the slope coefficient ( 1φ ) from the following 
autoregressive model of order one (AR1):  
  tjX ,   =  tjtjX ,1,10 υφφ ++ −           (2) 
Where: 
  tjX ,   =  Firm j’s earnings before extraordinary items in year t.  
 Values of 1φ  close to 1 indicate highly persistent earnings, while values of 1φ  
close to 0 imply highly transitory earnings.  To have this variable conform to the ordering 
of attributes, this study uses the negative of the parameter, tjEPERSISTENC ,  = 1φ− , so 
that smaller values of tjEPERSISTENC ,  correspond to more persistent earnings, thereby 
higher quality. 
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(3) Predictability  
 Lipe (1990) and Francis et al. (2004) define earnings predictability as the ability 
to predict earnings based on its past value.  Therefore, this study measures earnings 
predictability as the standard deviation of residuals ( tj ,υ ) from Equation (2).  Small 
values of the residuals ( tj ,υ ) imply more predictable and higher quality earnings. 
 
(4) Smoothness  
 As in Leuz et al. (2003) and Biddle and Hilary (2006), earnings smoothness is 
measured as the correlation between the change in accruals and the change in cash flows.   
 tjSMOOTH , =  ),( ,, tjtj CFOAcc ΔΔρ      (3) 
Where:  
 tjSMOOTH , =    Firm j’s Spearman correlation between the change in accruals 
and the change in cash flow from operation (both scaled by 
lagged total assets) in year t. 
 A smaller level of earnings smoothing indicates higher accounting quality. 
 
(5) Reliability and Relevance 
 Reliability and relevance are both captured by examining the association of stock 
prices and returns with accounting data.  Considerable research has focused on the 
association between capital markets and financial statement information.  Ball and Brown 
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(1968) examine the relationship between earnings per share changes and security price 
changes, show that these two move in the same direction, and conclude that accounting 
earnings contains useful information for capital markets and that earnings does represent 
real economic events.  Easton and Zmijewski (1989) test the correlations between 
earnings response coefficients and revision coefficients11 and the correlations between 
earnings response coefficients and systematic risk, and find that there is a positive 
relationship between earnings response coefficients and the revision coefficients, and a 
negative relationship between earnings response coefficients and systematic risk.  This 
implies that accounting earnings reflects stock market changes.  They also document that 
earnings response coefficients vary cross-sectionally in a predictable manner, thereby 
providing evidence that earnings contain useful and reliable information. 
Other papers show how market returns respond to accounting earnings.  Studies, 
such as Collins and Kothari (1989), Bernard and Thomas (1989 and 1990), Ball and 
Bartov (1996), find that even after the earnings announcement, estimated cumulative 
abnormal returns continue to drift up for good news firms and drift down for bad news 
firms, and therefore conclude that stock market does not fully reflect the information of 
accounting earnings.     
Lang et al. (2003) measure the relationship between stock prices and accounting 
data using the explanatory power ( 2R ) of the price regression: 
 tjP ,    =   tjtjtj NIPSBVPS ,,2,10 εααα +++    (4) 
                                               
11
 Earnings response coefficients measure the response of stock prices to accounting earnings 
announcements. Revision coefficients are coefficients relating earnings changes to returns.  
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Where: 
 tjP ,    =   Firm j’s stock price as of six months after the fiscal year-end in 
year t. 
 tjBVPS ,    =   Firm j’s book value of shareholders’ equity per share in year t.  
 tjNIPS ,     =   Firm j’s net income per share in year t.  
Francis et al. (2004) also measure the value relevance of earnings using the 
explanatory power ( 2R ) of the following regression:  
  tjR ,   =  tjtjtj NINI ,,2,10 εααα +Δ++     (5) 
Where:  
  tjR ,   =  Firm j’s stock return in year t.  
  tjNI ,   =  Firm j’s net income in year t.  
 tjNI ,Δ  =  Firm j’s change in net income in year t. It is calculated as: 
1,, −− tjtj NINI .  
Following Lang et al. (2003) and Francis et al. (2004), this study measures 
reliability and relevance as 2R s of both Equation (4) and (5).  Quality accounting data are 
more strongly associated with capital market data, therefore higher 2R s in Equation (4) 
and (5) indicate higher quality of accounting.     
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(6) Timeliness  
 Ball et al. (2000) define timeliness as the degree to which accounting income 
incorporates economic income.  To measure timeliness of earnings, Basu (1997) 
compares the explanatory power ( 2R ) from the regression equation of accounting 
earnings on stock returns for good news and bad news.  Adopting Basu (1997), this study 
measures timeliness by regressing the following equation:  
 1,, −tjtj PX  =   tjtjtjtjtj DRRRDR ,,,1,0,10 εββαα ++++    (6) 
Where: 
 tjX ,    =  Firm j’s earnings per share in year t. 
 1, −tjP    =  Firm j’s stock price per share in year t-1.  
 tjDR ,    =  Dummy variable; it is set to be 1 if tiR , <0, and 0 otherwise. 
  tjR ,    =  Firm j’s stock return in year t, when stock return is calculated 
as:  ending stock price + dividends – beginning stock price.    
 Quality accounting data are more strongly associated with share price, therefore a 
higher 2R  indicates higher quality of accounting. 
 
(7) Conservatism 
 Ball et al. (2000) also define conservatism as asymmetric timely loss recognition 
– whether accounting income reflects bad economic news more quickly than good news.  
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Following Basu (1997), this study measures earnings conservatism based on the 
coefficients in Equation (6).  0β  is the coefficient measurement of good news and 1β  is 
the coefficient measurement for bad news.  [( 0β + 1β )/ 0β ] measures the extent to which 
earnings are sensitive to negative returns relative to positive returns.  A higher 
measurement implies more timely loss recognition, implying higher accounting quality.  
This measurement is also consistent with the one found in Ball et al. (2000) and Lang et 
al. (2003).   
 In summary, eight earnings quality variables are used in this study, and they are: 
(1) accrual quality, (2) earnings persistence, (3) predictability, (4) smoothness, (5) 
reliability, (6) relevance, (7) timeliness, and (8) conservatism.  Table 2 provides 
descriptive statistics of the sample countries for the eight accounting quality measures.  
Compared to prior accounting quality studies, several quality measures in this study are 
different from those reported in other previous studies.  For example, timeliness proxies 
in the Table 2 – which are measured by R2 of the regression equation of accounting 
earnings on stock returns for good news and bad news – for Canada, the U.S., U.K., and 
France are much lower than these values in Ball et al. (2000).  The R2 for the U.S. in Basu 
(1997) is also lower than that in Ball et al. (2000), but the U.S. timeliness values in Table 
2 are even lower than in Basu (1997).  However, the timeliness proxies for Germany, 
Japan, and Australia in Ball et al. (2000) are similar to the ones presented in the Table 2.  
Also, the accrual quality and persistence proxies for the U.S. in this study are higher than 
reported in Francis et al. (2004).  These may be due to the different sample structures – 
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sample firms, size, and periods are different –, or possibly because of a problem with 
quality measurement.12     
 
3. Convergence measurement 
Motivated by Land and Lang (2002), this study regresses mean-adjusted E/P 
ratios on indicator variables for each country and year (1999-2005) as follows: 
 tiPE ,/  =   ∑∑
= =
n
i
m
t
titi C
1 1
,,
α                          (7) 
Where: 
tiPE ,/     =   Country i’s mean-adjusted earnings/price ratio in year t, where 
it is calculated as: earnings/price ratio for each country and 
each year – average earning/price ratio (over firms and 
countries) for each year. 
 ti,α      =   Coefficient estimate of country i in year t. 
 tiC ,      =   Country indicator variable of country i in year t.  
 Coefficient estimates of ti,α  in the regression represent deviations for a given 
country and year from the mean.  Therefore coefficients that are getting significantly 
smaller and closer to 0 over time are evidence of international accounting convergence 
over time. 
  Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for earnings price ratios over 1999-2005 by 
country.  The values are similar to Land and Lang (2002) although the sample periods are 
                                               
12
 The U.S. samples for this study are collected from the Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial file and 
the Compustat Global Issues file. These samples are different from those used in Ball et al. (2000) and 
Basu (1997). Or, the differences might be due to the problem of the use of R2 as an accounting quality 
measure. For more explanation, refer to p.41.  
  28 
different.  For example, the median E/P ratio over 1994-1999 is 0.063 for Australia and 
0.053 for United States in Land and Lang (2002).  These are 0.066 and 0.051 in my 
study.  The median E/P ratios in my sample over 1999-2005 for Germany (0.063) and 
Japan (0.052) are a little higher compared to those values over 1994-1999 shown in Lang 
and Lang (2002), which are 0.045 for Germany and 0.031 for Japan.   
 Following the conventions in Compustat Global Issue, earnings per price is 
defined as earnings before extraordinary items divided by market value at year-end.  This 
study begins with a potential sample of 89,748 firm years and uses the same deletion 
rules as Land and Lang (2002).  Because earnings price ratios are difficult to interpret for 
loss firms, this studies deletes observations with negative earnings (32 percent of 
potential observations over seven sample years) and, to mitigate the effects of extreme 
observations, this study deletes the top 1 percent of earnings per price ratios, leaving 
59,402 observations. 
 Table 4 contains the convergence measurement results.  The values in the table 
are absolute values of coefficient estimates ( ti,α ) of the regression in Equation (7).  The 
signs of the coefficients do not have significant meanings.  Only the magnitudes show the 
degree of the dispersions from the world mean, thereby are meaningful.  Therefore, the 
absolute values of the coefficients are used as convergence proxies for each country and 
year.  If these values get smaller and closer to 0 over time there is evidence of 
international accounting convergence over time.  In general, the results suggest 
convergence in the sense that dispersion is reduced.  The last row of the Table 4 
represents the mean coefficient across countries for each year, and shows that the 
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coefficient is significantly reduced in 2001 and continuously reduces afterward.  In 
addition, convergence is apparent for most of the sample countries, with the coefficients 
moving toward the mean especially over last five sample years.  For example, the mean 
earnings per price ratio for Australia, which was 0.1191 greater than the mean in 2000, is 
0.00548 greater than the mean in 2004.  Earnings per price multiples not only in Canada, 
France, United Kingdom, and United States but also in Belgium, China, Korea, and South 
Africa move from above the mean toward the mean, and the results show a narrowing of 
differences in earnings multiples over the sample period for most of the countries.  Figure 
1 graphically shows the changes in accounting convergence proxies by country based on 
the Table 4.       
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY TESTS 
The purpose of this study is to empirically examine the functional relationship 
between accounting convergence and financial reporting quality.  This study uses the 
following panel regression: 
 ktiEQ ,,Δ  =   tititi GROWTHGDPCON ,3,2,10 ββββ ++Δ+  
 tiiii GLEGSYSFLEGSYSELEGSYS ,654 )()()( εβββ ++++ (8) 
Where:  
ktiEQ ,,Δ   =  Changes in country i’s earnings quality variable of k (k = 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8). k represents eight earnings quality variables. 
Changes in earnings quality are calculated with quality 
measures of each consecutive year. 
tiCON ,Δ   =   Changes in country i’s accounting convergence variable. They 
are computed with the absolute value of the coefficient 
estimates ( ti,α ) of equation (7) for each consecutive year.   
tiGDP ,   =   Country i’s per capita GDP in year t.  
tiGROWTH ,  =   Country i’s average annual percent growth of per capita GDP in 
year t.  
iLEGSYS      =   Country i’s legal system and enforcement indicator variable. It 
is set to be 1 for each legal system indicator variable, 0 
otherwise. iELEGSYS )( , iFLEGSYS )( , and iGLEGSYS )(  
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represent English origin common law countries, French origin, 
and German origin code law countries, respectively.  
Change in earnings quality is measured as the difference in earnings quality 
between consecutive years.  There are eight earnings quality variables used in this study, 
and they are: accrual quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, reliability and 
relevance, timeliness, and conservatism.  Equation (8) is estimated for each of these eight 
variables.  Change in accounting convergence is measured as the difference in coefficient 
estimate ( ti,α ) of Equation (7) between consecutive years.   
As control variables, per capita GDP, and growth rate of GDP, and a country’s 
legal system and enforcement are added in the model.  Since economically large and fast 
growing countries could have higher quality accounting, GDP controls the size of 
country and GROWTH controls the economic growth of the country.  Also, since 
common law countries generally have higher earnings quality and German civil law 
countries have better quality compared to the other code law countries, LEGSYS is added 
in the model.  LEGSYS controls country’s legal and enforcement system.  Following La 
Porta et al. (1997, 2000), code law countries are separated into 3 categories, which are 
German origin, French origin, and Scandinavian origin countries.  Dummy variables 
represent common law countries, German origin, and French origin code law countries, 
with Scandinavian origin code law countries being the group left out.  Table 5 shows per 
capita GDP, annual percent changes in per capita GDP, and the legal origin for each 
sample country. 
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Since the data in this study are panel data – data sets that consist of time-series 
observations on each of several cross-sections, this study runs panel regressions instead 
of pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regressions.  There are two kinds of information in 
panel data: the cross-sectional information reflected in the differences between subjects, 
and the time-series or within-subject information reflected in the changes within subjects 
over time.  The panel regression is useful to capture these different types of information.  
Moreover, if there are country factors affecting a country’s accounting quality that do not 
change over time and the unobserved country effect is correlated with accounting 
convergence, then using pooled regressions on the seven years of data results in biased 
and inconsistent estimates.  In addition, Figure 1 shows that earnings multiples were far 
above the mean in the year 2000, and after that dispersion was significantly reduced, 
which may imply something happened in 2000 and a need to control for a year effect.  If 
there are year factors affecting each year’s accounting quality proxy that is constant 
cross-sectionally and the unobserved year effect is correlated with accounting 
convergence measurement, then results from pooled regression are biased, because 
pooled regression recognizes data as each independent observation.  Therefore, to control 
possible omitted variables that are constant over time but vary cross-sectionally and that 
are constant cross-sectionally but vary over time, this study runs random effects panel 
regression model.  The Hausman test results also suggest that it is safe to use the random 
effect model.   
The remainder of this Chapter presents the correlation matrix for the variables 
used in the model, and the results of the relation between accounting quality and 
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convergence with overall sample, followed by empirical examination of this relation for 
converged countries only.      
 
1. Correlations and multicollinearity 
 Table 6 contains the correlation coefficients for the variables used in the panel 
regression model.  These coefficients are examined to determine whether 
multicollinearity exists in the model.  The highest correlation coefficient obtained is 
LEGSYS(E) and LEGSYS(F). They are correlated at –0.576.  The correlation is less than 
0.80, thus it does not indicate a considerable collinearity.  There are no other correlation 
coefficients greater than 0.50, with the remaining coefficients having values far less than 
0.50.   
 Among the eight accounting quality measures, the first four measures – accrual 
quality, persistence, predictability, and smoothness – are expected to have positive signs, 
and the last four measures – reliability, relevance, timeliness, and conservatism – are 
expected to have negative signs.  Correlation coefficients show that only predictability 
and relevance have the expected signs, thus change in accounting convergence may not 
be correlated with change in accounting quality attributes in the expected way.   
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 2. Empirical results with overall sample     
The empirical examination begins with an analysis of the relationships between 
accounting quality and accounting convergence with the overall sample.  The prediction 
is that the slope coefficients on changes in the accounting convergence variable ( 1β ) 
have significantly positive values for (1) accrual quality, (2) persistence, (3) 
predictability, and (4) smoothness, and significantly negative values for (5) reliability, (6) 
relevance, (7) timeliness, and (8) conservatism, so improvement in earnings quality is 
associated with international convergence.  However, the results based on panel 
regressions of accounting quality on convergence do not show evidence of an association 
between earnings quality and international convergence.  Table 7 shows that persistence 
and smoothness are significantly negatively related to accounting convergence.  
Predictability and relevance have the right signs, and accrual quality, reliability, 
timeliness, and conservatism have the wrong signs, but they are not statistically 
significant.  Therefore, the panel regression results with overall sample countries reveal 
little evidence of a significantly positive association between accounting convergence and 
accounting quality improvements. 
As sensitivity analyses, this study also runs logit and pooled regressions with year 
dummy variables.  To account for the annual variation of change in earnings quality from 
each country, annual dummy variables are added to the original model.  As a part of logit 
and pooled regressions, this study also measures the changes in quality and convergence 
as the difference between (1) beginning and ending years of sample periods (1999 – 
2005), (2) average of first two years and average of last two years (1999, 2000 – 2004, 
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2005), and (3) average of first three years and average of last three years (1999, 2000, 
2001 – 2003, 2004, 2005), instead of measuring the changes as the difference between 
consecutive years, and examines the relation between quality and convergence.  Since 
annual variations of the change in some of the accounting quality attributes and 
convergence are small, it might be difficult to obtain empirically significant changing 
effects.  However, the sensitivity tests also find no overall positive association between 
accounting convergence and accounting quality.  The results are still mixed and not 
significant. Therefore, the sensitivity tests results are not presented here. 
 
   3. Results of converged countries 
The next step in the study is to partition the sample countries into converged 
countries and non-converged countries and examine the association of accounting 
convergence and quality with data of converged countries only.  Because it is possible 
that the tests with all sample countries aggregate many important factors, it might wash 
out the net impact of accounting convergence on accounting quality.  However, there is 
no clearly superior way to define converged countries, thus this study defines converged 
countries based on (1) analysis of variance test (ANOVA) and (2) t-test.  The ANOVA 
tests the mean differences of sample companies’ mean-adjusted E/P ratios between seven 
year periods within each sample country, and defines converged countries if mean 
numbers are significantly reduced at 5% confidence level.  In addition, three different t-
tests are run to determine converged countries.  The mean numbers of company-level 
mean-adjusted E/P ratios within each sample country are compared between (1) 
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beginning and ending years of sample periods (1999 – 2005), (2) average of first two 
years and average of last two years (1999, 2000 – 2004, 2005), and (3) average of first 
three years and average of last three years (1999, 2000, 2001 – 2003, 2004, 2005).  
Countries whose mean numbers are significantly reduced between these two periods are 
categorized as converged countries.  Table 8 provides the lists of converged countries 
defined based on each different approach. 
Once samples are partitioned, this study re-runs Equation (8) for the converged 
countries, and examines the relation between convergence and quality.  Table 9 presents 
the regression results of converged countries defined based on t-test between 1999-2000 
and 2004-2005.  As presented in Table 9, predictability is significantly and positively 
related to accounting convergence and persistence and smoothness are significantly and 
negatively related to accounting convergence.  Accrual quality, reliability, and relevance 
have the right signs, while timeliness and conservatism have the wrong signs, but are not 
statistically significant.  The results based on the other approaches to define converged 
countries (defined by ANOVA test, t-test between 1999 and 2005, t-test between 1999, 
2000, 2001 and 2003, 2004, 2005) are qualitatively similar.  Therefore, this study 
concludes that results are still mixed even with data of converged countries only and 
there is little evidence of a significant positive association between accounting 
convergence and accounting quality.  The results suggest that accounting convergence 
alone does not necessarily improve accounting quality.   
Other ways to partition the sample countries are based on (1) institutional clusters 
suggested by Leuz et al. (2003), (2) country’s legal system and enforcement (common 
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law vs. code law)13, and (3) country’s level of economic development.  Table 10 provides 
descriptive statistics for these country classifications.  Comparing Table 8 and Table 10, 
converged countries do not necessarily have strong investor protection, have a common 
law legal system, or are economically developed.  The list of converged countries is a 
mixture of strong and weak investor protection countries, common and code law legal 
system countries, and developed and developing countries.  The study does not find any 
specific patterns between converged countries and institutional clusters, legal systems, 
and country’s level of development.  Therefore, the relationship between accounting 
convergence and improvement in accounting quality is not a matter of a country’s 
investor protection and legal system, or the level of economic development.      
                                               
13
 For common law and code law classification, see Table 5, Panel C: Legal Origin.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
SUMMARY, LIMITATION, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Much attention has recently been focused on international accounting 
convergence and the possible consequences of adopting IFRS.  All European Union (EU) 
countries, Canada, many Asia-Pacific countries, Australia, and New Zealand have 
required or allowed the adoption of IFRS.  An increasing number of countries have been 
considering adopting or converging with IFRS.  Prior studies have provided advantages 
and disadvantages of accounting convergence.  Some researchers believe that accounting 
convergence enhances comparability of financial statements, and some opponents state 
that a single set of accounting standards cannot satisfy the information needs of a diverse 
global environment.  Therefore, accounting convergence and the impact of convergence 
are empirical issues. 
The purpose of this study is to explore the functional relationship between 
earnings quality and convergence.  This study investigates: (1) whether cross-country 
accounting differences, reflected in differences in earnings multiples, are reduced over 
time; and (2) whether quality of accounting is positively related with accounting 
convergence.  The findings of this study show that cross-country accounting differences 
are reduced over time in most of the sample countries and accounting convergence is a 
prevalent accounting trend in the world.  However, this study does not find significant 
evidence of a positive relation between accounting convergence and improvement in 
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accounting quality.  The panel regression results show that persistence and smoothness 
are significantly and negatively related to accounting convergence.  Predictability and 
relevance have the right signs, and accrual quality, reliability, timeliness, and 
conservatism have the wrong signs, but they are not statistically significant.  Thus, the 
study concludes that the association between accounting standards convergence and 
earnings attributes is mixed and not significant.  The results are unchanged in sensitivity 
tests. 
Regression analyses with data of converged countries also show that there is little 
evidence of a significant positive association between accounting convergence and 
accounting quality.  Predictability is significantly and positively related to accounting 
convergence, and persistence and smoothness are significantly and negatively related to 
accounting convergence.  Accrual quality, reliability, and relevance have the right signs, 
while timeliness and conservatism have the wrong signs, but they are not statistically 
significant.  Therefore, accounting convergence alone does not necessarily improve 
accounting quality.  In addition, no evidence is found that a country’s investor protection 
and legal system and the level of economic development have an impact on the relation 
between accounting convergence and improvement in accounting quality. 
There are several possible reasons to explain the results.  First, it is possible that 
the earnings multiple approach used in this study for measuring accounting convergence 
is wrong or not appropriate to measure the degree of accounting convergence.  
Furthermore, mean-adjusted earnings multiple is a measurement of financial reporting 
convergence, not a measurement of accounting standards convergence.  The hypothesis 
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developed in this study is based on the assertion that accounting standards convergence 
enhances comparability of financial statements, therefore leads to high quality accounting.  
Financial reporting convergence may not be related to accounting standards convergence.   
In addition, the annual variations of change in accounting convergence are small 
and fluctuate year by year, thus it is difficult to define significantly converged countries.  
Converged countries determined by different approaches used in this dissertation are 
mixed, therefore test results driven with the mixture of converged and non-converged 
countries are likely to aggregate and wash out the net impact of convergence on quality 
improvement. 
Second, it is also possible that some of the accounting quality measures used in 
this study are not the right measures to capture earnings quality when applied to an 
international setting.  For example, using a sample of US and international firms, 
Wysocki (2005) documents that the widely-used Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual 
quality model fails to capture firm’s earnings quality.  The Wysocki (2005) results show 
that the classic Dechow and Dichev (2002) model is dominated by the negative 
contemporaneous correlation between accruals and cash flows, and that a strong negative 
accruals and cash flow correlation is associated with low accounting quality in US and 
international firms.  Also, accounting quality measures used in this study are developed 
based on US data and may be good at capturing accounting quality for US firms, but not 
appropriate to generally use for each different country, because there are many different 
country factors affecting a country’s accounting quality and quality measurements used 
in the study fail to control for these factors in each different country.  Development of 
accounting quality measurements to consider and better control for each country’s 
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environment is one of the limitations of the study and also should be done in further 
research.   
Third, this study uses 8 multiple measures of accounting quality since there is no 
agreed-upon approach to capture it, but some of the measurements have inconsistent 
implications.  For example, smoothness and predictability perhaps capture earnings 
quality oppositely in an international environment.  An argument can be made that 
smoother earnings are more predictable, and vice versa.  Countries such as Japan or 
Greece, whose earnings are more smoothed may have more predictable earnings than 
countries such as United States or United Kingdom, whose earnings are less smoothed.  
In addition, Givoly et al. (2006) report that Basu’s (1997) traditional method to measure 
timeliness and conservatism is not a reliable measure to assess the overall conservatism 
and can lead to incorrect inferences.  Therefore, the conclusions about accounting quality 
depend on how it is defined. 
Another limitation is the use of regression explanatory power (R2) as an 
accounting quality measure.  Three accounting quality attributes – specifically, reliability, 
relevance, and timeliness – are measured by R2s in this study.  However, R2 requires 
making the strong assumption of a linear relation between the dependent variable and 
independent variable(s) and is very sensitive to sample size and number of variables.  
Different sample structure can explain why a timeliness measurement in my study is not 
similar to prior U.S. studies.   
  42 
Also, some of the earnings quality measures do not appear to be stable from year 
to year.  This may be a problem with outliers, so I may need to better control for outliers 
using a standard deletion rule of top and bottom 1% of the sample. 
This study concludes that accounting convergence alone does not improve 
accounting quality, and that the positive association between convergence and quality is 
not related to country’s investor protection, legal enforcement, and level of economic 
development.  However, this study fails to document other factors that possibly may 
affect the positive relation between these two.  Thus it may be interesting to determine 
potential specific factors affecting accounting convergence on improvement in 
accounting quality for future research.  In addition, as with most accounting convergence 
studies, there remains the potential to develop stronger proxies for accounting 
convergence. 
For this study, the relationship between accounting convergence and accounting 
quality is examined at country level.  Further study may try to test this relation using firm 
level data, because using country level data may aggregate important firm level 
information.  This study measures accounting quality for each country over firms for each 
year, but future study may try to measure accounting quality for each firm over sample 
periods and examine the association of accounting convergence with firm level 
accounting quality measures.   
Because of the scarce amount of empirical research examining the impact of 
accounting standards convergence on accounting quality, more theoretical work on this 
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association between accounting convergence and quality, and development of stronger 
models to examine this relation could be another avenue for future research.   
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APPENDIX 
FIGURE 1 
International Accounting Convergence by Country 
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FIGURE 1 (Continued) 
International Accounting Convergence by Country 
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FIGURE 1 (Continued) 
International Accounting Convergence by Country 
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TABLE 1 
Sample: Firm-Year Observations 
 
Country Country 
Code 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 N % 
Australia AUS 196 195 186 175 176 189 139 1256 2.11% 
Austria AUT 47 48 41 41 42 38 16 273 0.46% 
Belgium BEL 67 58 52 46 51 54 26 354 0.60% 
Bermuda BMU 156 150 154 181 204 209 118 1172 1.97% 
Brazil BRA 65 65 64 66 74 74 55 463 0.78% 
Canada CAN 313 305 235 254 267 266 213 1853 3.12% 
Switzerland CHE 106 111 97 90 98 104 57 663 1.12% 
Chile CHL 52 56 54 48 51 53 47 361 0.61% 
China CHN 95 101 189 261 322 717 948 2633 4.43% 
Cayman Islands CYM 29 29 33 65 88 112 72 428 0.72% 
Germany DEU 376 397 351 311 304 311 174 2224 3.74% 
Denmark DNK 69 69 61 70 61 62 42 434 0.73% 
Spain ESP 86 81 70 78 72 80 39 506 0.85% 
Finland FIN 61 61 62 65 64 65 39 417 0.70% 
France FRA 324 378 345 318 313 323 145 2146 3.61% 
United Kingdom GBR 782 714 607 569 573 569 347 4161 7.00% 
Greece GRC 47 42 25 31 28 31 23 227 0.38% 
Hong Kong HKG 70 72 69 68 73 79 38 469 0.79% 
Indonesia IDN 111 91 93 123 132 124 73 747 1.26% 
India IND 188 187 161 161 167 170 72 1106 1.86% 
Ireland IRL 32 29 22 24 21 21 11 160 0.27% 
Israel ISR 30 28 19 22 22 25 10 156 0.26% 
Italy ITA 49 71 106 89 103 110 75 603 1.02% 
Japan JPN 1940 1951 1793 1959 2203 2259 1961 14066 23.68% 
Korea KOR 100 114 108 123 160 168 100 873 1.47% 
Mexico MEX 34 31 35 33 34 34 21 222 0.37% 
Malaysia MYS 326 296 291 333 392 400 251 2289 3.85% 
Netherlands NLD 122 110 100 96 101 108 72 709 1.19% 
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TABLE 1 (Continued) 
Sample: Firm-Year Observations 
 
Country Country 
Code 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 N % 
Norway NOR 60 55 56 57 58 66 42 394 0.66% 
New Zealand NZL 48 43 35 33 29 35 26 249 0.42% 
Pakistan PAK 30 27 24 25 26 23 18 173 0.29% 
Philippines PHL 59 52 50 52 63 64 33 373 0.63% 
Poland POL 25 21 17 17 17 17 9 123 0.21% 
Portugal PRT 37 31 31 33 31 29 23 215 0.36% 
Singapore SGP 172 166 188 185 203 218 143 1275 2.15% 
Sweden SWE 104 126 123 121 122 137 85 818 1.38% 
Thailand THA 165 155 162 156 188 190 134 1150 1.94% 
Turkey TUR 29 30 24 23 25 21 10 162 0.27% 
Taiwan  TWN 113 117 130 129 179 182 109 959 1.61% 
United States USA 2172 1958 1583 1594 1618 1703 1474 12102 20.37% 
South Africa ZAF 77 74 62 67 59 62 37 438 0.74% 
Total  8964 8695 7908 8192 8814 9502 7327 59402 100.00% 
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TABLE 2  
Measures for Accounting Quality 
Panel A: Accruals Proxy for Country and Year 
 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Australia 0.38493 0.22129 0.33038 0.25895 1.45665 0.16948 0.28538 
Austria 0.06642 0.04984 0.08060 0.05946 0.06572 0.02592 0.05888 
Belgium 0.08649 0.08889 0.10138 0.14675 0.06735 0.06066 0.09192 
Bermuda 0.22342 0.23778 0.37088 0.73786 0.79831 0.08476 0.14243 
Brazil 0.06504 0.06931 0.07525 0.08892 0.12296 0.09241 0.08565 
Canada 0.14812 0.13009 0.22267 0.53083 0.38958 0.16200 0.20272 
Switzerland 0.06744 0.06460 0.09918 0.11481 0.05967 0.05349 0.05761 
Chile 0.07181 0.05336 0.05703 0.06019 0.05701 0.05609 0.05925 
China 0.07092 0.06841 0.14714 0.11742 0.10352 0.13392 0.10689 
Cayman Islands 0.09937 0.08694 0.27436 0.21113 0.69366 0.13972 0.25086 
Germany 0.08528 0.23577 0.24400 0.22330 0.14618 0.28684 0.13211 
Denmark 0.10048 0.09575 0.09311 0.09929 0.08824 0.04195 0.08647 
Spain 0.05519 0.07924 0.07803 0.06071 0.05420 0.03625 0.03701 
Finland 0.07469 0.08450 0.13256 0.10094 0.10994 0.06480 0.04690 
France 0.08670 0.14826 0.13432 0.36169 0.13797 0.04356 0.06218 
United Kingdom 0.20386 0.15799 0.16235 0.20829 0.16222 0.08445 0.09806 
Greece 0.06754 0.05902 0.05961 0.06274 0.05360 0.09540 0.06632 
Hong Kong 0.25653 0.10142 0.15424 0.09075 0.13631 0.09179 0.12130 
Indonesia 0.15177 0.13901 0.16701 0.30937 0.10302 0.09566 0.13430 
India 0.07059 0.07481 0.08467 0.08274 0.07436 0.04530 0.07739 
Ireland 0.09316 0.05011 0.14231 0.20808 0.04671 0.03050 0.07095 
Israel 0.07100 0.07336 0.08756 0.09845 0.09676 0.35236 0.08786 
Italy 0.06139 0.05252 0.09634 0.18697 0.06692 0.07950 0.07595 
Japan 0.05717 0.06397 0.06507 0.06777 0.07162 0.05758 0.05959 
Korea 0.05793 0.05673 0.08265 0.10216 0.08824 0.07251 0.06088 
Mexico 0.04445 0.05952 0.05443 0.06870 0.06574 0.01156 0.05073 
Malaysia 0.09613 0.09367 0.13370 0.13187 0.10304 0.09757 0.09286 
Netherlands 0.08552 0.12356 0.13424 0.19390 0.14820 0.06715 0.08822 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Measures for Accounting Quality 
Panel A: Accruals Proxy for Country and Year 
 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Norway 0.13015 0.13896 0.09967 0.12630 0.18558 0.10116 0.11301 
New Zealand 0.08179 0.05960 0.10141 0.06361 0.07243 0.03701 0.06931 
Pakistan 0.06465 0.08885 0.06245 0.04747 0.06701 0.03825 0.07241 
Philippines 0.06816 0.14089 0.20905 0.14162 0.16391 0.19974 0.11106 
Poland 0.06331 0.06977 0.04303 0.01730 0.05094 0.09985 0.05737 
Portugal 0.06073 0.04399 0.04420 0.04048 0.03882 1.16309 0.01241 
Singapore 0.08832 0.10234 0.11577 0.15018 0.15202 0.11893 0.12126 
Sweden 0.19322 0.13785 0.16984 0.39381 0.16006 0.14908 0.11836 
Thailand 0.13615 0.22916 0.17437 0.14639 0.07860 0.07588 0.10154 
Turkey 0.12344 0.09429 0.14989 0.06826 0.03779 19.91544 0.05102 
Taiwan  0.04792 0.05439 0.06680 0.06329 0.06616 0.07457 0.06219 
United States 0.26199 0.16111 0.28444 0.29315 0.63256 0.54840 0.36361 
South Africa 0.08727 0.07681 0.08225 0.07478 0.07797 0.01315 0.06871 
 
 
Note: The values of this panel represent the standard deviations of the sample firms’ residuals of Equation (1) for the countries. Small 
values of the standards deviations correspond to higher accruals quality and higher accounting quality.  
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Measures for Accounting Quality 
Panel B: Persistence Proxy for Country and Year 
 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Australia -0.012 -0.047 -0.0228 -0.0209 0.0768 -0.005211 0.0283 
Austria -0.0288 0.00857 -0.148 -0.1079 -0.0593 -0.0361 0.9251 
Belgium -0.0631 0.2342 -0.1033 0.1026 -0.1362 -0.0895 -0.018 
Bermuda -0.008931 -0.000757 -0.001417 -0.0183 -0.0233 -0.0121 -0.0378 
Brazil 0.2839 -0.009032 -0.0869 -0.0413 0.0545 0.145 -0.1074 
Canada 0.1221 0.0462 -0.067 0.1093 0.2426 -0.0796 -0.1709 
Switzerland 0.045 -0.0408 -0.1922 0.2869 0.001792 0.0371 0.0476 
Chile -0.0612 0.003308 0.004399 0.003207 0.0514 0.0161 0.1388 
China 0.0194 0.0283 -0.0758 0.046 0.0825 0.0534 -0.0648 
Cayman Islands -0.0741 0.0106 0.0259 0.0287 0.2405 -0.0127 -0.0116 
Germany 0.0832 -0.076 0.2406 0.4038 0.1554 -0.0474 -0.746 
Denmark -0.1181 -0.1255 0.0984 -0.0344 -0.1937 -0.0214 0.2706 
Spain -0.0706 0.002449 -0.0683 0.5877 -0.003131 -0.0385 0.0708 
Finland -0.0588 -0.0329 0.0364 -0.0357 -0.1064 -0.003472 0.0316 
France -0.0488 0.0823 0.2709 -0.1157 0.0548 -0.1028 0.0506 
United Kingdom -0.0351 -0.1106 -0.0245 0.0527 -0.0919 -0.000184 -0.1799 
Greece -0.1833 -0.0105 0.0173 0.0482 -0.0824 0.2537 0.1482 
Hong Kong 0.002071 0.0611 0.2583 0.2851 -0.3703 0.0134 -0.1858 
Indonesia -0.0632 0.001203 0.0365 -0.0231 -0.0972 -0.0965 0.269 
India -0.1469 0.001433 0.0322 -0.1252 -0.0115 0.0433 -0.01015 
Ireland 0.0216 0.1492 0.0364 0.9653 -0.9139 -0.4599 0.4793 
Israel -0.2504 -0.1722 0.2265 0.579 0.0468 -0.5966 -0.043 
Italy -0.112 0.0105 -0.0351 0.0931 0.1511 0.2387 -0.0268 
Japan 0.051 0.0296 0.0352 0.0401 0.0747 0.004789 0.0452 
Korea 0.0724 -0.1139 -0.008286 0.0645 0.0416 0.1507 0.0141 
Mexico -0.0121 0.008397 -0.0716 -0.00271 0.6643 -0.0364 0.2085 
Malaysia 0.006407 0.0852 0.002073 0.0398 -0.0796 0.04 -0.003397 
Netherlands 0.3026 -0.038 -0.082 0.1104 -0.0432 0.0322 -0.0607 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Measures for Accounting Quality 
Panel B: Persistence Proxy for Country and Year 
 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Norway 0.142 -0.007218 -0.186 -0.006624 -0.0129 -0.016 0.7619 
New Zealand 0.1906 -0.003523 0.9457 0.4505 -0.101 -0.1878 -0.1203 
Pakistan -0.0779 -0.0134 -0.1669 0.3275 0.2001 -0.3773 -0.2132 
Philippines 0.0193 0.0957 -0.0839 -0.1148 0.0258 0.0631 -0.0217 
Poland 0.0138 -0.0602 -0.0528 0.0145 0.1352 -0.9667 -0.0367 
Portugal -0.1733 -0.0473 0.8769 -0.457 -0.1801 -0.1399 0.3592 
Singapore 0.4366 -0.0234 0.0124 -0.1126 -0.0967 0.0221 0.0424 
Sweden 0.0997 0.1701 0.1585 -0.002628 -0.003798 -0.0823 0.177 
Thailand -0.0899 0.00066 0.0261 0.000126 0.0169 0.005971 0.0206 
Turkey 0.005454 -0.198 -0.0886 0.0398 -0.1177 -0.0134 -0.11001 
Taiwan  0.0162 -0.0867 0.0379 0.003251 0.0124 -0.0115 -0.0698 
United States 0.0121 -0.0132 0.003899 0.0106 -0.0499 -0.000652 -0.0223 
South Africa -0.1072 -0.0367 0.1271 0.1253 0.0918 0.0223 0.1152 
 
Note: The values of this panel represent negative values of the slope coefficients of the autoregressive Equation (2) for the sample 
countries. Smaller values correspond to more persistent earnings, thereby higher quality.  
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Measures for Accounting Quality 
Panel C: Predictability Proxy for Country and Year 
 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Australia 197.3748 140.2717 279.1531 316.6653 203.0806 163.3176 388.0345 
Austria 887.1610 422.6354 57.5187 42.6231 44.0274 14.4669 61.7946 
Belgium 830.8401 463.2451 163.8661 66.9151 44.6216 47.6088 166.1652 
Bermuda 228.3141 223.7290 490.6684 156.3900 102.5559 143.1494 174.8024 
Brazil 330.2647 474.2926 210.9941 418.2262 896.5992 1015.7100 542.9430 
Canada 97.0658 257.7739 169.1947 200.8157 181.3212 149.7761 180.4077 
Switzerland 162.0298 157.2040 239.3360 199.8259 164.3294 78.6642 152.7838 
Chile 3965.1300 6921.6200 3691.7100 3941.3800 3134.4900 4816.7000 1976.8200 
China 116.0622 275.5291 147.9738 844.7859 427.6602 430.9576 295.3729 
Cayman Islands 158.8210 138.7774 105.9705 73.7598 61.8284 76.4619 212.1620 
Germany 322.7781 369.8291 374.2133 329.4177 349.8746 240.1773 589.8864 
Denmark 187.2617 308.2837 159.4594 379.9784 273.4643 320.7079 128.6968 
Spain 2454.3500 4791.8600 3227.9400 632.7563 139.9196 72.1544 128.1886 
Finland 157.8003 237.0859 100.1245 75.6879 69.7463 105.6308 83.4192 
France 609.7179 575.8677 318.8313 288.7967 474.0952 258.6647 531.5927 
United Kingdom 395.2251 517.5069 187.6484 160.6618 228.6232 124.1682 675.7995 
Greece 2931.3300 6368.5300 2604.4000 198.0508 28.5112 72.3136 103.3956 
Hong Kong 448.7685 721.3140 757.1256 681.2666 855.1819 986.5477 1589.7400 
Indonesia 12185.0700 8595.4200 5943.2500 7251.5900 5358.8100 6591.3100 8422.3100 
India 1215.3200 2097.0900 1642.4800 2012.4800 3056.6600 4324.2900 2861.1300 
Ireland 30.0361 82.7133 166.5945 169.5966 118.2577 12.5221 30.2488 
Israel 239.6632 86.0459 273.9895 206.3512 102.4783 239.9850 349.6937 
Italy 3255.1100 5649.1500 1776.7200 737.1657 134.2431 147.2853 326.7990 
Japan 2645.9700 3285.4000 3073.6000 2619.1000 3297.5800 3648.7800 4143.4100 
Korea 9372.1200 7531.5400 6630.5800 9285.2300 7768.3300 8259.8800 5818.1900 
Mexico 4023.2200 1754.2500 1727.7100 1333.6200 5643.6500 3611.3000 2893.4100 
Malaysia 105.8867 93.5087 97.2805 107.8627 109.0582 121.6535 239.5934 
Netherlands 467.0605 527.6524 446.5427 232.6726 297.4451 676.1304 237.9656 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Measures for Accounting Quality 
Panel C: Predictability Proxy for Country and Year 
 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Norway 408.7399 1130.4700 1470.6800 1800.2900 781.4592 3104.8100 9299.3300 
New Zealand 51.6548 127.1112 162.9934 84.6165 128.5535 32.5453 36.4344 
Pakistan 733.4208 1682.5700 2160.6000 813.0162 629.9959 1055.7900 881.4761 
Philippines 1392.1700 867.9950 1063.2100 854.0779 898.8838 2115.5700 1175.8400 
Poland 222.2438 176.2826 558.1045 350.3981 271.6625 292.0146 506.4472 
Portugal 4771.9300 4143.6400 205.0917 20.6522 46.0893 40.7046 52.0631 
Singapore 61.2367 42.9142 90.1142 51.9153 68.1641 68.5630 62.7380 
Sweden 451.8233 759.4023 740.1949 484.9361 1156.3500 361.6404 319.5801 
Thailand 879.4964 1485.2300 1356.5600 2667.6400 624.7616 2963.9700 1388.9300 
Turkey 8233.7100 7155.8600 16138.4100 10362.5000 5255.5800 3529.3700 354.3825 
Taiwan  1618.2400 2229.6000 1954.1200 2339.2600 1883.5500 3421.8200 5845.7400 
United States 272.1854 402.2792 572.2874 571.3734 433.5380 706.1462 505.1108 
South Africa 425.9584 633.3493 1032.1500 894.1576 772.1782 1573.6700 984.6341 
 
Note: The values of this panel represent the standard deviations of the sample firms’ residuals from Equation (2) for the countries. 
Small values of the standard deviations of the residuals imply more predictable and higher quality earnings. 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Measures for Accounting Quality 
Panel D: Smoothness Proxy for Country and Year 
 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Australia 
-0.6894 -0.74127 -0.6302 -0.56125 -0.69944 -0.65421 -0.76053 
Austria 
-0.91128 -0.94958 -0.90718 -0.97182 -0.87916 -0.89711 -0.96429 
Belgium 
-0.91804 -0.87465 -0.91287 -0.89852 -0.90687 -0.76973 -0.91667 
Bermuda 
-0.74147 -0.85799 -0.85145 -0.81988 -0.82981 -0.82607 -0.86997 
Brazil 
-0.70505 -0.736 -0.86333 -0.9256 -0.81016 -0.67605 -0.83481 
Canada 
-0.74921 -0.71711 -0.74998 -0.81582 -0.81446 -0.65379 -0.76004 
Switzerland 
-0.86965 -0.9222 -0.81642 -0.77018 -0.82939 -0.86702 -0.89699 
Chile 
-0.88056 -0.90841 -0.9154 -0.8694 -0.88205 -0.88826 -0.73235 
China 
-0.94239 -0.95855 -0.93509 -0.94524 -0.92318 -0.89136 -0.82831 
Cayman Islands 
-0.8262 -0.78536 -0.79896 -0.81744 -0.73233 -0.76851 -0.71079 
Germany 
-0.81282 -0.8741 -0.85458 -0.85174 -0.85794 -0.80605 -0.7294 
Denmark 
-0.71987 -0.75413 -0.91485 -0.86284 -0.86258 -0.81757 -0.64231 
Spain 
-0.81289 -0.79148 -0.80146 -0.95601 -0.97407 -0.87172 -0.69091 
Finland 
-0.88126 -0.95639 -0.89071 -0.86074 -0.73922 -0.54335 -0.60522 
France 
-0.89561 -0.89882 -0.90418 -0.97224 -0.90597 -0.882 -0.65972 
United Kingdom 
-0.76874 -0.79673 -0.79926 -0.76949 -0.84407 -0.89642 -0.67828 
Greece 
-0.98376 -0.9723 -0.9573 -0.95531 -0.99537 -0.92338 -0.77043 
Hong Kong 
-0.94014 -0.92268 -0.87046 -0.77642 -0.88113 -0.82038 -0.92146 
Indonesia 
-0.84359 -0.9098 -0.94129 -0.84454 -0.83957 -0.77566 -0.74715 
India 
-0.84736 -0.84471 -0.79538 -0.83787 -0.86935 -0.88268 -0.98333 
Ireland 
-0.75124 -0.75887 -0.75134 -0.79669 -0.83937 -0.97117 -0.90909 
Israel 
-0.86453 -0.93789 -0.83346 -0.98701 -0.77647 -0.71324 -0.6 
Italy 
-0.89544 -0.90111 -0.92235 -0.9858 -0.93693 -0.92833 -0.735 
Japan 
-0.94181 -0.93648 -0.90603 -0.92598 -0.9144 -0.90618 -0.90156 
Korea 
-0.85142 -0.94214 -0.87805 -0.77266 -0.90057 -0.81093 -0.86784 
Mexico 
-0.94404 -0.75011 -0.83449 -0.86916 -0.81725 -0.7075 -0.7697 
Malaysia 
-0.834 -0.7757 -0.82672 -0.83397 -0.84475 -0.8801 -0.73156 
Netherlands 
-0.65826 -0.84464 -0.78308 -0.83191 -0.87847 -0.87433 -0.72304 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Measures for Accounting Quality 
Panel D: Smoothness Proxy for Country and Year 
1 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Norway 
-0.8155 -0.63507 -0.63532 -0.66839 -0.90822 -0.81197 -0.64706 
New Zealand 
-0.87176 -0.6564 -0.7309 -0.61029 -0.92496 -0.88136 -0.37143 
Pakistan 
-0.73714 -0.71607 -0.74207 -0.90632 -0.92095 -0.76716 -0.83636 
Philippines 
-0.77876 -0.94499 -0.91983 -0.90457 -0.8779 -0.78815 -0.70059 
Poland 
-0.76551 -0.88515 -0.57769 -0.88947 -0.99301 -0.58681 -0.7646 
Portugal 
-0.95476 -0.9288 -0.8042 -0.99908 -0.9923 -0.90286 -0.982 
Singapore 
-0.9058 -0.92205 -0.8824 -0.8752 -0.81963 -0.84909 -0.68874 
Sweden 
-0.88141 -0.59822 -0.64198 -0.74764 -0.85762 -0.81789 -0.78632 
Thailand 
-0.92061 -0.91155 -0.92565 -0.92252 -0.90836 -0.8562 -0.89696 
Turkey 
-0.86185 -0.88484 -0.52571 -0.78865 -0.81385 -0.89323 -0.93617 
Taiwan  
-0.89673 -0.90659 -0.80078 -0.90342 -0.88246 -0.94548 -0.70045 
United States 
-0.76761 -0.75548 -0.75734 -0.78565 -0.79816 -0.7978 -0.68386 
South Africa 
-0.81709 -0.82512 -0.76492 -0.90272 -0.75377 -0.45835 -0.83333 
 
Note: The values of this panel represent the Spearman correlation values between the change in accruals and the change in cash flow 
from operation. A smaller value indicates higher accounting quality. 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Measures for Accounting Quality 
Panel E: Reliability Proxy for Country and Year 
 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Australia 0.5745 0.426 0.2738 0.3761 0.2552 0.3284 0.4 
Austria 0.2889 0.3656 0.0695 0.3886 0.4888 0.4084 0.5511 
Belgium 0.131 0.1342 0.2825 0.8535 0.9573 0.9805 0.9863 
Bermuda 0.0527 0.0945 0.1292 0.032 0.1057 0.2943 0.5921 
Brazil 0.0002 0.0009 0.0001 0.0015 0.0014 0.004 0.0067 
Canada 0.0717 0.1667 0.3644 0.3701 0.443 0.5544 0.5936 
Switzerland 0.2444 0.2521 0.2439 0.2799 0.4483 0.5348 0.8441 
Chile 0.059 0.5913 0.0671 0.2349 0.3666 0.4139 0.0626 
China 0.1111 0.1151 0.0535 0.0585 0.0753 0.0894 0.0366 
Cayman Islands 0.6497 0.5391 0.684 0.4307 0.4836 0.4203 0.6569 
Germany 0.096 0.4153 0.081 0.1355 0.2089 0.0795 0.8452 
Denmark 0.2425 0.2091 0.0294 0.8839 0.771 0.8779 0.8599 
Spain 0.2276 0.2891 0.2272 0.2828 0.2235 0.3075 0.6642 
Finland 0.2566 0.0973 0.3652 0.4564 0.4625 0.5605 0.5261 
France 0.2127 0.7861 0.8452 0.8319 0.7021 0.3805 0.4873 
United Kingdom 0.1043 0.0359 0.0879 0.0046 0.0076 0.0364 0.0544 
Greece 0.1686 0.0642 0.0523 0.6827 0.7024 0.5323 0.5426 
Hong Kong 0.4611 0.4249 0.8115 0.7547 0.6941 0.7457 0.6687 
Indonesia 0.0219 0.0307 0.0989 0.0162 0.0015 0.0026 0.0043 
India 0.2455 0.5571 0.6436 0.5576 0.8647 0.8556 0.8444 
Ireland 0.2185 0.2122 0.7692 0.7029 0.9367 0.6304 0.7681 
Israel 0.7775 0.7807 0.7475 0.7287 0.8462 0.9561 0.9974 
Italy 0.002 0.1841 0.0484 0.4577 0.4046 0.3297 0.0016 
Japan 0.3237 0.1173 0.2836 0.3264 0.329 0.39 0.4102 
Korea 0.0008 0.0025 0.0035 0.0094 0.0131 0.0039 0.0033 
Mexico 0.172 0.0643 0.3788 0.5054 0.2002 0.2199 0.5036 
Malaysia 0.697 0.6272 0.6986 0.7907 0.7931 0.8506 0.5198 
Netherlands 0.8479 0.9056 0.9032 0.534 0.6167 0.5862 0.7325 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Measures for Accounting Quality 
Panel E: Reliability Proxy for Country and Year 
 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Norway 0.0425 0.2661 0.3772 0.4206 0.4942 0.6499 0.8159 
New Zealand 0.5363 0.5949 0.6544 0.6673 0.6392 0.8703 0.1909 
Pakistan 0.4873 0.8744 0.8374 0.9896 0.9481 0.9388 0.9157 
Philippines 0.6893 0.8579 0.8846 0.9503 0.8768 0.9353 0.7799 
Poland 0.5687 0.5298 0.3152 0.3065 0.644 0.4812 0.8259 
Portugal 0.1777 0.0821 0.718 0.467 0.2767 0.1723 0.5101 
Singapore 0.7289 0.3064 0.775 0.734 0.6954 0.831 0.8688 
Sweden 0.0381 0.0701 0.092 0.0915 0.2085 0.0999 0.244 
Thailand 0.4576 0.4823 0.3902 0.7351 0.7133 0.7441 0.722 
Turkey 0.8225 0.9818 0.9969 0.0658 0.1432 0.6473 0.7992 
Taiwan  0.4492 0.4996 0.5492 0.7612 0.7237 0.5347 0.676 
United States 0.0342 0.0265 0.0704 0.0509 0.0111 0.0692 0.3364 
South Africa 0.0079 0.3887 0.1109 0.9518 0.9573 0.9698 0.9868 
 
Note: The values of this panel represent explanatory powers (R²) of equation (4), and higher R² s in Equation (4) indicate higher 
quality of accounting.  
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Measures for Accounting Quality 
Panel F: Relevance Proxy for Country and Year 
 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Australia 0.9331 0.7237 0.9058 0.2719 0.0554 0.5724 0.0777 
Austria 0.0063 0.3014 0.0246 0.5001 0.4055 0.437 0.3579 
Belgium 0.4279 0.0659 0.0019 0.004 0.0572 0.0399 0.2013 
Bermuda 0.2658 0.4693 0.3507 0.5879 0.4386 0.6208 0.7167 
Brazil 0.0444 0.1185 0.0035 0.0176 0.0006 0.0027 0.0179 
Canada 0.5977 0.5036 0.3993 0.453 0.3771 0.3937 0.2983 
Switzerland 0.0086 0.0928 0.0034 0.2958 0.3059 0.0598 0.6498 
Chile 0.0033 0.0056 0.0038 0.0063 0.0053 0.0204 0.0186 
China 0.3092 0.7064 0.7075 0.8989 0.9001 0.9092 0.8401 
Cayman Islands 0.1474 0.1913 0.3099 0.1801 0.374 0.1979 0.355 
Germany 0.0102 0.5147 0.164 0.403 0.6108 0.5607 0.7432 
Denmark 0.0078 0.0235 0.109 0.1579 0.0579 0.2227 0.7734 
Spain 0.0606 0.2726 0.3339 0.1261 0.696 0.8271 0.7261 
Finland 0.0025 0.0044 0.0117 0.8874 0.7548 0.888 0.9062 
France 0.0069 0.0725 0.0006 0.0031 0.0069 0.0001 0.3198 
United Kingdom 0.654 0.8125 0.8174 0.5016 0.4818 0.7954 0.8425 
Greece 0.0462 0.3173 0.0748 0.2411 0.6607 0.7794 0.5663 
Hong Kong 0.8597 0.8505 0.8298 0.6799 0.9319 0.7859 0.9031 
Indonesia 0.0214 0.1135 0.4806 0.4524 0.0868 0.0879 0.0388 
India 0.4204 0.2537 0.6933 0.4838 0.347 0.3217 0.847 
Ireland 0.2187 0.5137 0.7399 0.7583 0.7788 0.7514 0.9105 
Israel 0.4108 0.0171 0.1678 0.1265 0.2112 0.6409 0.6975 
Italy 0.0259 0.7618 0.024 0.4749 0.6344 0.7536 0.7546 
Japan 0 0.0001 0 0.0002 0.0001 0.0005 0.0003 
Korea 0.0011 0.0013 0.0001 0.004 0.0088 0.0075 0.0092 
Mexico 0.2221 0.0869 0.0025 0.0695 0.0358 0.2326 0.3734 
Malaysia 0.3395 0.4271 0.1801 0.3639 0.6318 0.8522 0.5208 
Netherlands 0.4986 0.5216 0.7766 0.7376 0.7572 0.8943 0.8882 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Measures for Accounting Quality 
Panel F: Relevance Proxy for Country and Year 
 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Norway 0.5097 0.7984 0.8682 0.6008 0.7068 0.7333 0.9964 
New Zealand 0.845 0.7408 0.641 0.0976 0.0323 0.008 0.0091 
Pakistan 0.1189 0.074 0.0916 0.8277 0.4916 0.0459 0.3887 
Philippines 0.5706 0.0264 0.0567 0.0561 0.3031 0.5114 0.4755 
Poland 0.4137 0.0632 0.0073 0.0726 0.0106 0.5066 0.2721 
Portugal 0.4551 0.0072 0.1213 0.6141 0.6913 0.7179 0.0121 
Singapore 0.8207 0.1952 0.6868 0.7032 0.8748 0.9478 0.2964 
Sweden 0.0001 0.3231 0.5959 0.5428 0.8108 0.9067 0.8949 
Thailand 0.0694 0.0069 0.0403 0.0645 0.0674 0.1576 0.1477 
Turkey 0.0301 0.0343 0.1216 0.1199 0.0621 0.0048 0.4459 
Taiwan  0.1757 0.1825 0.0065 0.0418 0.0343 0.0471 0.0171 
United States 0.6093 0.6452 0.6173 0.3223 0.5271 0.6366 0.278 
South Africa 0.8994 0.4872 0.4771 0.4961 0.7724 0.1244 0.1653 
 
Note: The values of this panel represent explanatory powers (R²) of Equation (5), and higher R² s in Equation (5) indicate higher 
quality of accounting.  
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Measures for Accounting Quality 
Panel G: Timeliness Proxy for Country and Year 
 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Australia 0.0489 0.0867 0.0956 0.0022 0.0276 0.0041 0.0711 
Austria 0.0102 0.1601 0.0902 0.2156 0.2157 0.2703 0.9123 
Belgium 0.5304 0.0466 0.0376 0.2384 0.2705 0.1279 0.0959 
Bermuda 0.0025 0.0019 0.0036 0.0042 0.0249 0.0005 0.0061 
Brazil 0.0501 0.0138 0.0296 0.0069 0.0044 0.0026 0.0178 
Canada 0.0161 0.002 0.031 0.0025 0.0447 0.0631 0.0567 
Switzerland 0.0479 0.0364 0.0235 0.0176 0.0445 0.156 0.0123 
Chile 0.0198 0.1549 0.1834 0.0099 0.0531 0.0158 0.0483 
China 0.0039 0.0317 0.029 0.0573 0.065 0.0286 0.3565 
Cayman Islands 0.063 0.2072 0.0372 0.2361 0.1799 0.008 0.0143 
Germany 0.0044 0.051 0.0528 0.033 0.0023 0.0192 0.1131 
Denmark 0.2094 0.222 0.0443 0.0308 0.1028 0.1793 0.7664 
Spain 0.0095 0.0974 0.0596 0.1784 0.0091 0.0051 0.0171 
Finland 0.0299 0.1577 0.2838 0.3853 0.2303 0.1805 0.3254 
France 0.0093 0.0144 0.0026 0.0521 0.0834 0.0314 0.01 
United Kingdom 0.0001 0.0373 0.0465 0.0035 0.0009 0.0023 0.001 
Greece 0.2326 0.0461 0.167 0.223 0.2114 0.3308 0.0882 
Hong Kong 0.0023 0.0668 0.0657 0.1972 0.0031 0.0504 0.1447 
Indonesia 0.0102 0.0143 0.0154 0.0045 0.0003 0.0084 0.0194 
India 0.0883 0.0403 0.1081 0.0297 0.0049 0.0029 0.0699 
Ireland 0.0219 0.3458 0.2873 0.0453 0.0253 0.4576 0.5507 
Israel 0.1256 0.0385 0.0554 0.3712 0.0627 0.2578 0.1947 
Italy 0.4872 0.0368 0.0173 0.0381 0.1946 0.2252 0.0772 
Japan 0.0365 0.0281 0.0367 0.0278 0.0057 0.0014 0.0032 
Korea 0.0292 0.0075 0.0058 0.0571 0.0045 0.1933 0.0264 
Mexico 0.0533 0.0275 0.131 0.1095 0.5084 0.0216 0.0307 
Malaysia 0.009 0.0641 0.0747 0.0202 0.0611 0.0003 0.0425 
Netherlands 0.0646 0.1141 0.1687 0.0111 0.0111 0.0009 0.0966 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Measures for Accounting Quality 
Panel G: Timeliness Proxy for Country and Year 
 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Norway 0.1545 0.0081 0.0514 0.1722 0.0049 0.0056 0.0334 
New Zealand 0.0526 0.1446 0.1214 0.1579 0.0025 0.0163 0.4344 
Pakistan 0.1771 0.0416 0.1541 0.018 0.0111 0.0751 0.3776 
Philippines 0.0043 0.0289 0.0253 0.0304 0.0107 0.022 0.0092 
Poland 0.0138 0.1152 0.0351 0.0675 0.0183 0.25 0.9783 
Portugal 0.0262 0.1867 0.1054 0.0967 0.017 0.0475 0.3739 
Singapore 0.0014 0.1108 0.15 0.0851 0.0042 0.1072 0.0013 
Sweden 0.128 0.2332 0.059 0.008 0.0172 0.134 0.0252 
Thailand 0.0407 0.0475 0.034 0.0007 0.0057 0.0354 0.0287 
Turkey 0.0769 0.2447 0.084 0.0386 0.1548 0.1284 0.4033 
Taiwan  0.0535 0.0259 0.0157 0.0037 0.0158 0.003 0.0229 
United States 0.0004 0.0005 0.0002 0.001 0.0025 0.0002 0.0027 
South Africa 0.2621 0.0158 0.148 0.2103 0.1168 0.1377 0.511 
 
Note: The values of this panel represent the explanatory powers (R²) of Equation (6). Higher R² indicates higher quality of accounting. 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Measures for Accounting Quality 
Panel H: Conservatism Proxy for Country and Year 
 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Australia -4363.5116 -1183.8677 -22953.4413 -4.2013 -128.8773 -2170.7448 131.6360 
Austria -0.8613 -10.3139 -1.2360 6.0633 -10.3556 12243.6008 -4772.3237 
Belgium -1.0518 9.1079 -0.9737 -0.8327 -19.0237 -99.7105 -4.3322 
Bermuda -2951.5849 -373.6083 -13.8521 78.6427 679963.2490 -51.9803 -126.1108 
Brazil 43.1416 -0.9721 -0.8549 -1.3866 -1.5254 -1.1540 -0.9744 
Canada -14.2855 -5.4290 -72.6564 -9.3748 -95.7872 -44.0634 -12.4308 
Switzerland -0.8558 -1.2019 0.7917 22.3512 -2.8256 -704.4655 1.4915 
Chile -1.0000 -0.4182 1325.6549 -0.9998 -1.1100 -0.9725 -0.9137 
China -1.9178 -60.5931 -31.8028 -596.4308 -265.6960 -221.8137 -4.5063 
Cayman Islands 15.4429 277.8530 -31.4021 217.0113 259.3179 -443.5932 1505.9294 
Germany 1.2273 0.2581 4.9588 -18.9197 -4.9448 -35.6383 -199.9043 
Denmark -1.1914 -1.3384 -1.2346 -1.5982 -5.2889 -10.0009 -3.8303 
Spain -4.0672 1025.8716 -114.7553 -1005.4113 -165.3272 12.3713 0.0000 
Finland 43.3160 773.8095 6025.3780 -36.7392 -151.6778 -29.1062 -26.6612 
France 0.4249 -1.5537 -1.0718 -5.5545 -1.4471 -1.0261 29.1652 
United Kingdom -3.0387 -463.1849 -274.0384 -219.8708 -1407.4128 -241.2661 393.8532 
Greece 23.8333 20.1867 -0.9045 -4.6031 -1796.5226 1611.2289 -536.1474 
Hong Kong 72.3206 6973.4513 -408.5514 -8010.8445 -9184.9177 1772.9997 5254.7170 
Indonesia -2.6425 -1.5057 -3.4050 68.7331 -1.6894 -1.2545 -2.2205 
India -34.7330 -15.8105 -13.4698 -26.3389 -14.5258 -0.8148 0.0000 
Ireland 3.0268 16.3630 3.4729 -1.5700 0.1627 5.7492 -0.0077 
Israel 6.0493 4.7001 -0.9345 -1.0475 0.0021 -1.6659 -339.6118 
Italy -1.0461 -4.8164 -7.6337 -411.7647 -518.7005 63.1971 -12.4598 
Japan -1698.8987 -1.3238 -0.7696 -1.1575 -8.6600 0.4758 5.8150 
Korea 12.9402 -1.0056 -2.3357 -24.5353 -1.0512 -11.9306 -15.6294 
Mexico -0.0624 -1.0595 -1.0467 -126.9391 -0.0888 -1327.8801 -63.8259 
Malaysia -19.9141 -532.4977 -68.3888 -553.8252 -212.8113 178.2300 -181.5009 
Netherlands -2.1835 0.1468 368.5322 -9.8954 -103.7929 -62.5826 -327.6477 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Measures for Accounting Quality 
Panel H: Conservatism Proxy for Country and Year 
 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Norway 422.9692 -1.7917 -3.6666 446.6292 12.6943 -4.4367 43.1925 
New Zealand -116.8204 -3.1475 -89.4946 2.6061 -9.8346 -71.9197 7.6136 
Pakistan -49.4738 -9.4434 27.7101 0.0000 0.0000 106.9519 -32.3746 
Philippines -4.8334 -1.3738 -121.3787 -79.9014 241.6684 -308.5960 34.1086 
Poland -1.9786 -1.4838 -0.2478 1609.3647 0.0034 -28.0598 -11.5855 
Portugal 0.0000 10.8370 33.4413 -2739.2739 -31.3052 -91.1702 195.3571 
Singapore 3615.2011 3.2714 -385.4888 -649.0272 -309.0385 -269.6467 -31.9826 
Sweden -311.0876 7.3183 -52.9931 -1.7879 -64.7481 -30.3307 -153.1756 
Thailand -7.8644 17.5349 -9.4184 -7.8179 -22.3582 1.2195 1.7976 
Turkey -0.6820 -1.0546 -1.4879 -0.9926 6.0557 -0.9216 0.0000 
Taiwan  -2.3497 -15.9696 -6.8340 -26.0386 -48.0153 -2.0165 -221.6470 
United States -7.0703 -172.3076 -14.2957 -3277.6369 -601.0871 0.3739 -1786.4551 
South Africa -61.2464 3.8974 -143.8416 -976.1108 -191.2965 -1578.8924 300.0636 
 
Note: The values of this panel represent conservatism proxies for each year and country. The conservatism proxies are computed 
based on the coefficients [( 10 ββ + ) / 0β ] in Equation (6). A higher proxy implies higher accounting quality. 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics for E/P Ratios over 1999-2005 
 
Country Code N Median Mean 1st Quartile 3rd Quartile 
Australia AUS 1256 0.0667  0.1235  0.0438  0.1043  
Austria AUT 273 0.0776  0.3948  0.0466  0.1585  
Belgium BEL 354 0.0699  0.5672  0.0403  0.1349  
Bermuda BMU 1172 0.0808  0.1665  0.0475  0.1425  
Brazil BRA 463 0.0769  0.1508  0.0346  0.1256  
Canada CAN 1853 0.0603  0.0835  0.0351  0.0893  
Switzerland CHE 663 0.0662  0.1052  0.0412  0.1069  
Chile CHL 361 0.0638  0.1154  0.0298  0.0928  
China CHN 2633 0.0385  0.0592  0.0187  0.0666  
Cayman Islands CYM 428 0.0811  0.1059  0.0479  0.1307  
Germany DEU 2224 0.0633  0.2207  0.0346  0.1077  
Denmark DNK 434 0.0719  0.1259  0.0414  0.1248  
Spain ESP 506 0.0869  0.1683  0.0529  0.2023  
Finland FIN 417 0.0677  0.1286  0.0427  0.1111  
France FRA 2146 0.0716  0.1984  0.0406  0.1244  
United Kingdom GBR 4161 0.0682  0.1347  0.0407  0.1087  
Greece GRC 227 0.0583  0.1527  0.0311  0.0862  
Hong Kong HKG 469 0.0788  0.1097  0.0480  0.1221  
Indonesia IDN 747 0.0813  0.1163  0.0453  0.1337  
India IND 1106 0.0860  0.1527  0.0509  0.1477  
Ireland IRL 160 0.0780  0.1383  0.0520  0.1244  
Israel ISR 156 0.0489  0.0749  0.0168  0.0825  
Italy ITA 603 0.0534  0.2912  0.0316  0.0913  
Japan JPN 14066 0.0528  0.0887  0.0301  0.0842  
Korea KOR 873 0.0870  0.1533  0.0449  0.1658  
Mexico MEX 222 0.0722  0.1291  0.0356  0.1152  
Malaysia MYS 2289 0.0763  0.1335  0.0443  0.1193  
Netherlands NLD 709 0.0727  0.2574  0.0407  0.1122  
Norway NOR 394 0.0584  0.0689  0.0283  0.0871  
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics for E/P Ratios over 1999-2005 
 
Country Code N Median Mean 1st Quartile 3rd Quartile 
New Zealand NZL 249 0.0722  0.1772  0.0436  0.1094  
Pakistan PAK 173 0.0811  0.1146  0.0473  0.1398  
Philippines PHL 373 0.0773  0.1336  0.0375  0.1358  
Poland POL 123 0.0660  0.2903  0.0369  0.1068  
Portugal PRT 215 0.0735  0.7895  0.0392  0.1275  
Singapore SGP 1275 0.0702  0.1157  0.0434  0.1176  
Sweden SWE 818 0.0586  0.1381  0.0335  0.0898  
Thailand THA 1150 0.0815  0.1552  0.0496  0.1355  
Turkey TUR 162 0.0610  0.6489  0.0377  0.1210  
Taiwan  TWN 959 0.0700  0.0900  0.0429  0.1044  
United States USA 12102 0.0510  0.0691  0.0320  0.0746  
South Africa ZAF 438 0.0900  0.1310  0.0561  0.1297  
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TABLE 4 
Convergence Proxy for Each Country and Year 
 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Australia 0.07343 0.11912 0.01166 0.01134 0.00548 0.00548 0.01229 
Austria 0.019434 1.05929 0.0645 0.03464 0.0065 0.01278 0.01652 
Belgium 1.38116 0.8773 0.00008833 0.01251 0.00632 0.01082 0.01636 
Bermuda 0.04162 0.13966 0.03953 0.01965 0.01938 0.02522 0.02569 
Brazil 0.02129 0.03382 0.00085957 0.01642 0.01539 0.02397 0.03329 
Canada 0.19543 0.18098 0.01305 0.01656 0.00798 0.00407 0.0007706 
Switzerland 0.14758 0.19426 0.05565 0.00198 0.00341 0.00777 0.00608 
Chile 0.01796 0.16796 0.01997 0.01643 0.00259 0.00398 0.00517 
China 0.12249 0.16004 0.03128 0.03105 0.01503 0.01882 0.01596 
Cayman Islands 0.18748 0.17634 0.01076 0.05793 0.02304 0.03318 0.02831 
Germany 0.17902 0.17433 0.01747 0.00559 0.00123 0.00636 0.00072572 
Denmark 0.1009 0.09249 0.01588 0.0241 0.00682 0.00133 0.00553 
Spain 7.84528 7.29047 0.00759 0.00046263 0.00254 0.00344 0.02393 
Finland 0.12856 0.07197 0.06222 0.02011 0.00536 0.00908 0.01736 
France 0.0726 0.19646 0.01128 0.00188 0.0009244 0.00466 0.00262 
United Kingdom 0.07125 0.07861 0.00102 0.00839 0.00549 0.00547 0.00798 
Greece 0.15016 0.08208 0.02643 0.00165 0.00518 0.01334 0.0023 
Hong Kong 0.17048 0.13579 0.01111 0.00977 0.01231 0.01808 0.02938 
Indonesia 0.16568 0.16289 0.03532 0.05544 0.02099 0.01323 0.04103 
India 0.04143 0.08785 0.03664 0.05838 0.02052 0.02026 0.00626 
Ireland 0.11175 0.04817 0.009 0.01302 0.02702 0.00227 0.01781 
Israel 0.22369 0.20351 0.03844 0.02049 0.00999 0.01163 0.02377 
Italy 1.43849 0.51374 0.01962 0.01521 0.00634 0.00474 0.00552 
Japan 0.14511 0.16678 0.01947 0.00932 0.00391 0.00609 0.00892 
Korea 0.01743 0.06986 0.06627 0.0598 0.04275 0.03589 0.01362 
Mexico 0.05905 0.21917 0.01334 0.00275 0.00048397 0.01824 0.02178 
Malaysia 0.06851 0.05467 0.01244 0.01817 0.0108 0.01991 0.03036 
Netherlands 0.14683 0.51513 0.00693 0.00361 0.0087 0.00325 0.00359 
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TABLE 4 (Continued) 
Convergence Proxy for Each Country and Year 
 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Norway 0.21837 0.24222 0.02985 0.00509 0.00326 0.01067 0.00635 
New Zealand 0.08411 0.09516 0.11803 0.0144 0.00978 0.01056 0.00293 
Pakistan 0.15008 0.1609 0.03599 0.02747 0.01213 0.0066 0.02817 
Philippines 0.05781 0.18125 0.05428 0.04574 0.02563 0.0267 0.02096 
Poland 0.19236 0.94429 0.00587 0.05255 0.00215 0.01756 0.01012 
Portugal 1.84 2.1341 0.07631 0.03431 0.00153 0.0013 0.00642 
Singapore 0.14559 0.10434 0.00722 0.02097 0.00981 0.02571 0.02111 
Sweden 0.13408 0.09485 0.02263 0.0002231 0.00818 0.0063 0.00453 
Thailand 0.17649 0.1671 0.04887 0.02547 0.01233 0.02032 0.03357 
Turkey 1.6162 1.02876 0.02044 0.01912 0.02107 0.01136 0.02337 
Taiwan  0.19759 0.19949 0.00035628 0.00936 0.0035 0.01724 0.0205 
United States 0.20099 0.23172 0.02091 0.02209 0.0168 0.01532 0.00586 
South Africa 0.123 0.1738 0.07832 0.02936 0.03572 0.02531 0.03265 
Mean coefficient 0.450750341 0.464163902 0.028704736 0.02080014 0.011179716 0.013129512 0.01559674 
 
Note: The values in this table represent the absolute values of the coefficients of the regression of earnings to price ratios on each 
country and year indicator variables. The last row of the table shows mean coefficient across countries for each year.  
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TABLE 5 
Measures for Control Variables 
Panel A: Per Capita GDP 
 
Country Code 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Australia AUS 21,193.84 20,326.93 18,936.85 20,988.91 26,502.13 31,740.98 34,932.40 
Austria AUT 26,699.40 24,265.76 24,038.81 25,800.53 31,516.37 35,865.84 37,085.75 
Belgium BEL 24,796.29 22,696.47 22,495.44 24,399.76 29,868.60 34,382.01 35,460.58 
Bermuda BMU 33,258.44 33,923.60 34,602.08 35,294.12 36,000.00 36,720.00 37,454.40 
Brazil BRA 3,477.98 3,761.58 3,189.53 2,867.00 3,085.39 3,654.20 4,788.92 
Canada CAN 21,776.56 23,658.83 23,103.94 23,457.94 27,455.06 31,111.04 35,105.45 
Switzerland CHE 37,020.25 34,263.23 34,748.24 38,326.79 44,581.98 49,600.61 50,386.83 
Chile CHL 4,860.59 4,944.37 4,451.93 4,314.91 4,698.25 6,012.36 7,351.32 
China CHN 861.211 945.601 1,038.03 1,131.81 1,269.83 1,486.02 1,715.94 
Cayman Island CYM 5,756.93 5,900.85 6,048.37 7,379.87 8,949.17 10,601.46 12,151.98 
Germany DEU 26,123.92 23,168.07 22,957.16 24,523.16 29,616.31 33,262.94 33,864.69 
Denmark DNK 32,776.11 30,118.82 30,021.17 32,492.60 39,558.04 45,174.15 47,905.52 
Spain ESP 15,389.56 14,379.75 14,966.15 16,693.12 21,067.67 24,467.12 25,997.05 
Finland FIN 25,350.70 23,612.30 24,145.89 26,145.42 31,657.45 36,228.95 37,320.20 
France FRA 24,144.88 21,955.96 21,946.80 23,791.52 29,144.45 33,048.13 33,924.82 
United Kingdom GBR 24,998.78 24,542.20 24,286.12 26,541.08 30,470.47 36,019.02 37,042.22 
Greece GRC 14,484.93 13,352.98 13,659.32 15,472.93 20,074.59 23,831.85 25,560.19 
Hong Kong HKG 24,600.42 25,144.02 24,744.99 24,340.51 23,428.22 24,393.92 26,000.11 
Indonesia IDN 745.792 806.898 772.661 928.142 1,099.67 1,187.74 1,309.08 
India IND 448.382 454.511 460.512 473.086 542.888 618.482 712.394 
Ireland IRL 25,835.66 25,493.90 27,180.76 31,329.61 39,487.93 45,371.52 48,604.21 
Israel ISR 18,194.77 19,887.55 19,088.01 17,235.16 17,802.26 18,559.62 19,308.45 
Italy ITA 21,129.55 19,293.40 19,541.11 21,317.51 26,308.26 30,097.54 30,524.59 
Japan JPN 34,634.41 36,810.99 32,233.80 30,809.29 33,180.06 36,075.92 35,671.58 
Korea KOR 9,557.88 10,890.91 10,177.48 11,504.22 12,710.94 14,180.59 16,443.76 
Mexico MEX 4,975.88 5,928.50 6,257.56 6,433.63 6,244.40 6,697.57 7,446.86 
Malaysia MYS 3,484.89 3,844.24 3,664.73 3,884.22 4,160.94 4,651.49 5,041.58 
Netherlands NLD 26,141.54 24,250.65 24,990.27 27,206.57 33,240.83 37,418.65 38,617.88 
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TABLE 5 (Continued) 
Measures for Control Variables 
Panel A: Per Capita GDP 
 
Country Code 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Norway NOR 35,619.37 37,520.08 37,840.31 42,525.73 49,316.72 56,344.18 65,509.21 
New Zealand NZL 14,852.36 13,578.30 13,231.96 15,195.22 19,788.38 24,036.34 26,438.81 
Pakistan PAK 527.275 538.648 509.1 501.877 562.804 655.489 727.53 
Philippines PHL 1,018.88 994.291 913.9 966.176 982.148 1,037.62 1,153.78 
Poland POL 4,344.03 4,455.20 4,976.28 5,179.89 5,668.03 6,617.42 7,943.34 
Portugal PRT 12,185.19 11,051.37 11,250.24 12,339.42 15,003.39 17,069.70 17,597.56 
Singapore SGP 20,909.36 23,077.09 20,692.44 21,112.96 22,065.82 25,329.69 26,879.15 
Sweden SWE 28,632.62 27,338.76 24,916.48 27,346.76 33,997.49 38,826.79 39,658.00 
Thailand THA 1,984.94 1,966.75 1,835.78 1,999.30 2,228.54 2,479.15 2,706.51 
Turkey TUR 2,875.93 2,995.16 2,126.45 2,675.46 3,462.93 4,288.53 5,061.99 
Taiwan TWN 13,526.16 14,426.46 13,027.53 13,093.49 13,254.22 14,204.98 15,223.76 
United States USA 33,196.97 34,770.98 35,491.27 36,311.11 37,640.71 39,841.40 41,959.68 
South Africa ZAF 3,029.06 2,986.45 2,632.83 2,440.23 3,622.15 4,665.70 5,159.79 
 
Note: Gross domestic product per capita in U.S. dollars. GDP is expressed in current U.S. dollars per person. Data are derived by first 
converting GDP in national currency to U.S. dollars and then dividing it by total population.  
Data source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2007. 
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TABLE 5 (Continued) 
Measures for Control Variables 
Panel B: GDP growth 
 
Country country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Australia AUS 4.4 3.4 2.1 4.1 3.1 3.7 2.8 
Austria AUT 3.3 3.4 0.8 0.9 1.1 2.4 2 
Belgium BEL 3.3 3.9 0.7 1.4 1 2.7 1.5 
Bermuda BMU 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Brazil BRA 0.3 4.3 1.3 2.7 1.1 5.7 2.9 
Canada CAN 5.5 5.2 1.8 2.9 1.8 3.3 2.9 
Switzerland CHE 1.3 3.6 1 0.3 -0.2 2.3 1.9 
Chile CHL -0.4 4.5 3.5 2.2 4 6 5.7 
China CHN 7.6 8.4 8.3 9.1 10 10.1 10.4 
Cayman Island CYM 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.9 3.6 4.2 6.1 
Germany DEU 1.9 3.1 1.2 0 -0.2 1.2 0.9 
Denmark DNK 2.6 3.5 0.7 0.5 0.4 2.1 3.1 
Spain ESP 4.7 5 3.6 2.7 3 3.2 3.5 
Finland FIN 3.9 5 2.6 1.6 1.8 3.7 2.9 
France FRA 3 4 1.8 1.1 1.1 2 1.2 
United Kingdom GBR 3 3.8 2.4 2.1 2.7 3.3 1.9 
Greece GRC 3.4 4.5 4.5 3.9 4.9 4.7 3.7 
Hong Kong  HKG 4 10 0.6 1.8 3.2 8.6 7.5 
Indonesia IDN 0.8 5.4 3.6 4.5 4.8 5 5.7 
India IND 6.7 5.3 4.1 4.3 7.3 7.8 9.2 
Ireland IRL 10.7 9.4 5.8 6 4.3 4.3 5.5 
Israel ISR 2.9 8.7 -0.6 -0.9 1.5 4.8 5.2 
Italy ITA 1.9 3.6 1.8 0.3 0 1.2 0.1 
Japan JPN -0.1 2.9 0.2 0.3 1.4 2.7 1.9 
Korea KOR 9.5 8.5 3.8 7 3.1 4.7 4.2 
Mexico MEX 3.8 6.6 0 0.8 1.4 4.2 2.8 
Malaysia MYS 6.1 8.9 0.3 4.4 5.5 7.2 5.2 
Netherlands NLD 4.7 3.9 1.9 0.1 0.3 2 1.5 
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TABLE 5 (Continued) 
Measures for Control Variables 
Panel B: GDP growth 
 
Country country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Norway NOR 2 3.3 2 1.5 1 3.9 2.7 
New Zealand NZL 4.3 3.6 2.6 4.6 3.2 4.4 2.1 
Pakistan PAK 3.7 4.3 2 3.2 4.9 7.4 8 
Philippines PHL 3.4 6 1.8 4.4 4.9 6.2 5 
Poland POL 4.5 4.2 1.1 1.4 3.8 5.3 3.5 
Portugal PRT 3.9 3.9 2 0.8 -0.7 1.3 0.5 
Singapore SGP 7.2 10.1 -2.4 4.2 3.1 8.8 6.6 
Sweden SWE 4.5 4.3 1.1 2 1.7 4.1 2.9 
Thailand THA 4.4 4.8 2.2 5.3 7.1 6.3 4.5 
Turkey TUR -4.7 7.4 -7.5 7.9 5.8 8.9 7.4 
Taiwan  TWN 5.7 5.8 -2.2 4.2 3.4 6.1 4 
United States USA 4.4 3.7 0.8 1.6 2.5 3.9 3.2 
South Africa ZAF 2.4 4.2 2.7 3.7 3.1 4.8 5.1 
 
Note: Gross domestic product, constant prices (annual percent change) in national currency.  
Data source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2007. 
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TABLE 5 (Continued) 
Measures for Control Variables 
Panel C: Legal Origin 
 
 
Country 
Common Law 
English Origin 
 
French Origin 
Code Law 
German Origin 
 
Scandinavian 
Australia Australia    
Austria   Austria  
Belgium  Belgium   
Bermuda Bermuda1    
Brazil  Brazil   
Canada Canada    
Switzerland   Switzerland  
Chile  Chile   
China   China1  
Cayman Island Cayman Island1    
Germany   Germany  
Denmark    Denmark 
Spain  Spain   
Finland    Finland 
France  France   
United Kingdom United Kingdom    
Greece  Greece   
Hong Kong Hong Kong    
Indonesia  Indonesia   
India India    
Ireland Ireland    
Israel Israel    
Italy  Italy   
Japan   Japan  
Korea   Korea  
Mexico  Mexico   
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TABLE 5 (Continued) 
Measures for Control Variables 
Panel C: Legal Origin 
 
 
Country 
Common Law 
English Origin 
 
French Origin 
Code Law 
German Origin 
 
Scandinavian 
Malaysia Malaysia    
Netherlands  Netherlands   
Norway    Norway 
New Zealand New Zealand    
Pakistan Pakistan    
Philippines  Philippines   
Poland   Poland1  
Portugal  Portugal   
Singapore Singapore    
Sweden    Sweden 
Thailand Thailand    
Turkey  Turkey   
Taiwan   Taiwan  
United States United States    
South Africa South Africa    
N=41 N=16 N=13 N=8 N=4 
 
Note: This classification is adopted from La Porta et al. (1997).  
1 These countries are not available for classification in La Porta et al. (1997). This study judgmentally classifies them into the 
categories. 
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TABLE 6 
Correlation Matrix 
 
 ΔEQk ΔCON GDP GROWTH LEGSYS(E) LEGSYS(F) LEGSYS(G) LEGSYS(S) 
ΔEQ1 1.00000 -0.00536 0.00592 -0.00928 0.00978 -0.01704 0.00540 0.00362 
ΔEQ2 1.00000 -0.19122 -0.05873 -0.08080 -0.00939 0.01029 0.00272 -0.00446 
ΔEQ3 1.00000 0.05582 0.12986 -0.17323 0.06268 -0.15354 0.03220 0.10151 
ΔEQ4 1.00000 -0.02571 -0.03698 -0.05019 0.04017 -0.06244 0.03771 -0.01408 
ΔEQ5 1.00000 0.00291 0.05783 -0.07920 -0.00397 -0.03227 0.00275 0.05460 
ΔEQ6 1.00000 -0.01630 0.08283 -0.05755 -0.11524 0.00003 0.04285 0.13506 
ΔEQ7 1.00000 0.10185 0.02460 0.08577 -0.00173 -0.04539 0.04233 0.02170 
ΔEQ8 1.00000 0.00098 -0.00222 0.00489 0.00099 -0.00032 -0.00075 -0.00016 
ΔCON 
 1.00000 0.04156 0.08549 0.08471 -0.14561 0.04853 0.03191 
GDP 
  1.00000 -0.37719 -0.04785 -0.29752 0.11721 0.40551 
GROWTH 
   1.00000 0.19106 -0.10605 -0.00780 -0.13473 
LEGSYS(E) 
    1.00000 -0.57607 -0.36299 -0.26304 
LEGSYS(F) 
     1.00000 -0.32673 -0.23676 
LEGSYS(G) 
      1.00000 -0.14919 
LEGSYS(S) 
       1.00000 
 
Note: ΔEQk = Change in accounting quality variable of k (k=1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8). k=1, k=2, k=3, k=4, k=5, k=6, k=7, and k=8 represent 
accrual quality, persistence quality, predictability, smoothness, reliability, relevance, timeliness, and conservatism, respectively.   
ΔCON = Change in accounting convergence proxy. 
GDP = Country’s per capita GDP. 
GROWTH = Country’s average annual percent growth of per capita GDP. 
LEGSYS(E), LEGSYS(F), LEGSYS(G), and LEGSYS(S) are country’s legal system and enforcement indicator variables representing 
English origin, French origin, German origin, and Scandinavian origin, respectively.
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TABLE 7 
Panel Regression: All Sample Countries 
Accounting Quality and Accounting Convergence 
 
Panel Regression Model: 
tiiiitititikti GLEGSYSFLEGSYSELEGSYSGROWTHGDPCONEQ ,654,3,2,10,, )()()( εβββββββ ++++++Δ+=Δ  
 
Panel A: Accrual Quality and Convergence 
Hausman Test1 P>0.8926 
R-Square 0.0006 
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-statistics 
Intercept -0.06796 0.5701 -0.12 
CON -0.01755 0.2309 -0.08 
GDP 4.432E-7 9.946E-6 0.04 
GROWTH 0.018751 0.0512 0.37 
LEGSYS(E) -0.01852 0.4496 -0.04 
LEGSYS(F) -0.00085 0.4787 -0.00 
LEGSYS(G) -0.0038 0.4797 -0.01 
 
Panel B: Persistence and Convergence 
Hausman Test1 P>0.6465 
R-Square 0.0038 
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-statistics 
Intercept 0.030879 0.1001 0.31 
CON -0.10067 0.0421 *-1.27 
GDP 5.249E-7 1.71E-6 0.31 
GROWTH -0.00061 0.00925 -0.07 
LEGSYS(E) -0.04149 0.0738 -0.56 
LEGSYS(F) -0.02463 0.0792 -0.31 
LEGSYS(G) -0.04328 0.0788 -0.55 
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TABLE 7 (Continued) 
Panel Regression: All Sample Countries 
Accounting Quality and Accounting Convergence 
 
Panel C: Predictability and Convergence 
Hausman Test1 P>0.0644 
R-Square 0.1065 
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-statistics 
Intercept 1126.268 466.0 **2.42 
CON 1.457723 167.4 0.01 
GDP -0.00886 0.00744 -1.19 
GROWTH -180.814 41.3250 ***-4.38 
LEGSYS(E) -172.115 312.9 -0.55 
LEGSYS(F) -807.739 337.0 **-2.40 
LEGSYS(G) -282.695 333.9 -0.85 
 
 
Panel D: Smoothness and Convergence 
Hausman Test1 P>0.3771 
R-Square 0.0433 
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-statistics 
Intercept 0.017626 0.0409 0.43 
CON -0.03407 0.0134 **-2.54 
GDP 7.048E-8 7.053E-7 0.10 
GROWTH 0.005352 0.00310 *1.73 
LEGSYS(E) -0.04304 0.0342 -1.26 
LEGSYS(F) -0.0303 0.0362 -0.84 
LEGSYS(G) -0.01398 0.0366 -0.38 
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TABLE 7 (Continued) 
Panel Regression: All Sample Countries 
Accounting Quality and Accounting Convergence 
 
Panel E: Reliability and Convergence 
Hausman Test1 P>0.7725 
R-Square 0.0093 
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-statistics 
Intercept 0.088697 0.0663 1.34 
CON 0.001346 0.0269 0.05 
GDP 1.17E-7 1.157E-6 0.10 
GROWTH -0.00626 0.00595 -1.05 
LEGSYS(E) -0.02355 0.0523 -0.45 
LEGSYS(F) -0.0381 0.0557 -0.68 
LEGSYS(G) -0.02588 0.0558 -0.46 
 
 
Panel F: Relevance and Convergence 
Hausman Test1 P>0.5168 
R-Square 0.0268 
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-statistics 
Intercept 0.110525 0.0760 1.45 
CON -0.00646 0.0308 -0.21 
GDP 5.44E-7 1.326E-6 0.41 
GROWTH -0.0015 0.00682 -0.22 
LEGSYS(E) -0.12251 0.0599 **-2.04 
LEGSYS(F) -0.08372 0.0638 -1.31 
LEGSYS(G) -0.076 0.0639 -1.19 
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TABLE 7 (Continued) 
Panel Regression: All Sample Countries 
Accounting Quality and Accounting Convergence 
 
Panel G: Timeliness and Convergence 
Hausman Test1 P>0.8503 
R-Square 0.0276 
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-statistics 
Intercept 0.013995 0.0455 0.31 
CON 0.021974 0.0179 1.23 
GDP 6.14E-8 7.83E-7 0.08 
GROWTH 0.004287 0.00419 1.12 
LEGSYS(E) -0.0156 0.0341 -0.46 
LEGSYS(F) -0.02767 0.0365 -0.76 
LEGSYS(G) 0.016926 0.0364 0.47 
 
 
Panel H: Conservatism and Convergence 
Hausman Test1 P>0.7441 
R-Square 0.0001 
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-statistics 
Intercept -1388.18 19687.1 -0.07 
CON 33.81697 7914.4 0.01 
GDP 0.01822 0.3426 0.05 
GROWTH 289.4936 1786.7 0.16 
LEGSYS(E) -36.2683 15303.2 -0.01 
LEGSYS(F) 232.5367 16322.8 0.01 
LEGSYS(G) -50.6773 16327.2 -0.01 
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Note: 1 Hausman tests are run to determine whether random effect model is appropriate for this research. The Hausman test tests the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by random effect model are the same as the ones estimated by the fixed effect model. If 
they are insignificant p-value (larger than 0.05), then it is safe to use random effect model. 
 
***, **, * denote 1% significance, 5% significance, and 10% significance, respectively. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
• ktiEQ ,,Δ  is changes in country i’s accounting quality variables of k (k = 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8). k represents eight accounting quality 
variables of (1) accrual quality, (2) persistence, (3) predictability, (4) smoothness, (5) reliability, (6) relevance, (7) timeliness, and 
(8) conservatism, respectively. Changes in accounting quality are calculated with quality measures of each consecutive year for 
these eight accounting quality variables. 
• tiCON ,Δ  is changes in country i’s accounting convergence variable. They are computed with coefficient estimates ( ti,α ) of 
equation (7) for each consecutive year. 
• tiGDP ,  is country i’s per capita GDP in year t. 
• tiGROWTH ,  is country i’s average annual percent growth of per capita GDP in year t. 
• iLEGSYS  is country i’s legal system and enforcement indicator variable. The dummy variables of iELEGSYS )( , iFLEGSYS )( , 
and iGLEGSYS )( represent English origin, French origin, and German origin, respectively.   
 
86
  
 
TABLE 8 
A List of Converged Countries 
 
Converged Countries  
All Sample Countries ANOVA1 99 vs 052 99-00 vs 04-053 99-01 vs 03-054 
Australia   Australia  
Austria     
Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium 
Bermuda     
Brazil     
Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada 
Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland 
Chile     
China China China China China 
Cayman Island Cayman Island Cayman Island Cayman Island Cayman Island 
Germany   Germany Germany 
Denmark  Denmark Denmark Denmark 
Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain 
Finland  Finland   
France France  France France 
United Kingdom  United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom 
Greece  Greece   
Hong Kong  Hong Kong  Hong Kong  Hong Kong  Hong Kong  
Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia 
India     
Ireland     
Israel Israel Israel Israel Israel 
Italy Italy  Italy Italy 
Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan 
Korea     
Mexico     
Malaysia     
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TABLE 8 (Continued) 
A List of Converged Countries 
 
Converged Countries  
All Sample Countries ANOVA1 99 vs 052 99-00 vs 04-053 99-01 vs 03-054 
Netherlands     
Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway 
New Zealand     
Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan 
Philippines Philippines  Philippines Philippines 
Poland  Poland   
Portugal Portugal Portugal Portugal Portugal 
Singapore Singapore Singapore Singapore Singapore 
Sweden     
Thailand  Thailand   
Turkey     
Taiwan  Taiwan  Taiwan  Taiwan  Taiwan  
United States United States United States United States United States 
South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa 
N=41 N=20 N=23 N=24 N=23 
 
Note: 1 Converged countries are defined based on ANOVA test at 5% level. 
2, 3, 4 Converged countries are defined if convergence coefficients are significantly reduced at 5% level based on t-test between 1999 
and 2005, between 99-00 and 04-05, and between 99-01 and 03-05, respectively. 
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TABLE 9 
Panel Regression: Converged Countries 
Accounting Quality and Accounting Convergence 
 
Panel Regression Model: 
tiiiitititikti GLEGSYSFLEGSYSELEGSYSGROWTHGDPCONEQ ,654,3,2,10,, )()()( εβββββββ ++++++Δ+=Δ  
 
Panel A: Accrual Quality and Convergence  
Hausman Test1 P>0.7969 
R-Square 0.0045 
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-statistics 
Intercept 0.060877 0.1062 0.53 
CON 0.002539 0.0305 0.08 
GDP -1.25E-06 1.721E-06 -0.73 
GROWTH 0.00486 0.00854 0.57 
LEGSYS(E) -0.01776 0.0807 -0.22 
LEGSYS(F) -0.02871 0.0868 -0.33 
LEGSYS(G) -0.01164 0.0837 -0.14 
 
Panel B: Persistence and Convergence 
Hausman Test1 P>0.3769 
R-Square 0.042 
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-statistics 
Intercept 0.095519 0.1277 0.76 
CON -0.10582 0.0725 **-2.12 
GDP -2.23E-7 2.067E-6 -0.11 
GROWTH 0.00112 0.0105 -0.11 
LEGSYS(E) -0.09817 0.0942 -1.04 
LEGSYS(F) -0.06484 0.1018 -0.64 
LEGSYS(G) -0.12018 0.0975 -1.23 
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TABLE 9 (Continued) 
Panel Regression: Converged Countries 
Accounting Quality and Accounting Convergence 
 
Panel C: Predictability and Convergence 
Hausman Test1 P>0.0745 
R-Square 0.1406 
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-statistics 
Intercept -8.7779 451.5 -0.02 
CON 242.8594 128.9 *1.88 
GDP 1.45E-02 0.00732 **1.98 
GROWTH 62.9955 36.809 *1.71 
LEGSYS(E) -463.553 338.1 -1.37 
LEGSYS(F) -680.646 364.6 *-1.87 
LEGSYS(G) -339.681 350.3 -0.97 
 
 
Panel D: Smoothness and Convergence 
Hausman Test1 P>0.7222 
R-Square 0.0661 
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-statistics 
Intercept -0.02464 0.0460 -0.54 
CON -0.03782 0.0132 **-2.86 
GDP 5.224E-7 7.459E-7 0.70 
GROWTH 0.003536 0.00370 0.96 
LEGSYS(E) -0.00055 0.0350 -0.02 
LEGSYS(F) 0.009853 0.0376 0.26 
LEGSYS(G) 0.007201 0.0363 0.20 
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TABLE 9 (Continued) 
Panel Regression: Converged Countries 
Accounting Quality and Accounting Convergence 
 
Panel E: Reliability and Convergence 
Hausman Test1 P>0.9217 
R-Square 0.0265 
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-statistics 
Intercept 0.163738 0.0962 0.091 
CON -0.00889 0.0273 -0.7453 
GDP -5.64E-07 1.56E-06 -0.7177 
GROWTH -0.0116 0.00791 -0.1447 
LEGSYS(E) -0.06636 0.0713 -0.3537 
LEGSYS(F) -0.07826 0.077 -0.3114 
LEGSYS(G) -0.05811 0.0739 -0.4328 
 
 
Panel F: Relevance and Convergence 
Hausman Test1 P>0.4953 
R-Square 0.0399 
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-statistics 
Intercept 0.148724 0.1253 1.19 
CON -0.01347 0.036 -0.37 
GDP -4.19E-07 2.03E-06 -0.21 
GROWTH -0.01299 0.0101 -1.29 
LEGSYS(E) -0.1213 0.0952 -1.27 
LEGSYS(F) -0.08728 0.1024 -0.85 
LEGSYS(G) -0.03662 0.0987 -0.37 
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TABLE 9 (Continued) 
Panel Regression: Converged Countries 
Accounting Quality and Accounting Convergence 
 
Panel G: Timeliness and Convergence 
Hausman Test1 P>0.9218 
R-Square 0.0296 
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-statistics 
Intercept 0.063999 0.0608 1.05 
CON 0.016796 0.0169 0.99 
GDP -7.42E-07 9.79E-07 -0.76 
GROWTH 0.002209 0.0051 0.43 
LEGSYS(E) -0.04576 0.0435 -1.05 
LEGSYS(F) -0.06404 0.0472 -1.36 
LEGSYS(G) -0.04137 0.045 -0.92 
 
 
Panel H: Conservatism and Convergence 
Hausman Test1 P>0.6391 
R-Square 0.0348 
Variable Estimate Standard Error t-statistics 
Intercept -1659.09 1448.6 -1.15 
CON 189.1162 416.5 0.45 
GDP 0.026041 0.0235 1.11 
GROWTH 250.6551 116.5 **2.15 
LEGSYS(E) 310.8993 1101.4 0.28 
LEGSYS(F) 602.4837 1184.7 0.51 
LEGSYS(G) 232.9348 1141.8 0.2 
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Note: This table shows the panel regression results with converged countries only. Converged countries are defined by testing the 
mean difference between the average of 1999–2000 mean-adjusted E/P ratios and the average of 2004–2005 mean-adjusted E/P ratios 
for each country.  If the mean is significantly reduced between these periods at 5% level, they are categorized as converged countries.  
 
1 Hausman tests are run to determine whether random effect model is appropriate for this research. The Hausman test tests the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by random effect model are the same as the ones estimated by the fixed effect model. If they 
are insignificant p-value (larger than 0.05), then it is safe to use random effect model. 
 
***, **, * denote 1% significance, 5% significance, and 10% significance, respectively. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
• ktiEQ ,,Δ  is changes in country i’s accounting quality variables of k (k = 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8). k represents eight accounting quality 
variables of (1) accrual quality, (2) persistence, (3) predictability, (4) smoothness, (5) reliability, (6) relevance, (7) timeliness, and 
(8) conservatism, respectively. Changes in accounting quality are calculated with quality measures of each consecutive year for 
these eight accounting quality variables. 
• tiCON ,Δ  is changes in country i’s accounting convergence variable. They are computed with coefficient estimates ( ti,α ) of 
equation (7) for each consecutive year. 
• tiGDP ,  is country i’s per capita GDP in year t. 
• tiGROWTH ,  is country i’s average annual percent growth of per capita GDP in year t. 
• iLEGSYS  is country i’s legal system and enforcement indicator variable. The dummy variables of iELEGSYS )( , iFLEGSYS )( , 
and iGLEGSYS )( represent English origin, French origin, and German origin, respectively. 
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TABLE 10 
Country Classification 
 
Panel A: Cluster membership of countries based on Leuz et al. (2003) 
Country Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Australia Australia   
Austria  Austria  
Belgium  Belgium  
Bermuda   Bermuda1 
Brazil   Brazil1 
Canada Canada   
Switzerland  Switzerland  
Chile   Chile1 
China   China1 
Cayman Island   Cayman Island1 
Germany  Germany  
Denmark  Denmark  
Spain   Spain 
Finland  Finland  
France  France  
United Kingdom United Kingdom   
Greece   Greece 
Hong Kong  Hong Kong    
Indonesia   Indonesia 
India   India 
Ireland  Ireland  
Israel Israel1   
Italy   Italy 
Japan  Japan  
Korea   Korea 
Mexico   Mexico1 
Malaysia Malaysia   
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TABLE 10 (Continued) 
Country Classification 
 
Panel A: Cluster membership of countries based on Leuz et al. (2003) 
Country Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Netherlands  Netherlands  
Norway Norway   
New Zealand New Zealand1   
Pakistan   Pakistan 
Philippines   Philippines 
Poland  Poland1  
Portugal   Portugal 
Singapore Singapore   
Sweden  Sweden  
Thailand   Thailand 
Turkey   Turkey1 
Taiwan   Taiwan   
United States United States   
South Africa  South Africa  
N=41 N=10 N=14 N=17 
 
Note: Sample countries are classified by three clusters according to Leuz et al. (2003). Cluster 1 countries are identified outsider 
economies with large stock markets, dispersed ownership, strong investor rights, and strong legal enforcement. Cluster 2 countries are 
identified insider economies with less-developed stock markets, concentrated ownership, weak investor rights, but strong legal 
enforcement. Cluster 3 is identified insider economies with weak legal enforcement. 
1
 These countries are not available for cluster classification in Leuz et al. (2003). This study judgmentally fit them into each cluster 
category.
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TABLE 10 (Continued) 
Country Classification 
 
Panel B: Country partition based on country’s level of economic development 
 
Country 
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Australia Australia  
Austria Austria  
Belgium Belgium Bermuda 
Bermuda  Brazil 
Brazil   
Canada Canada  
Switzerland Switzerland  
Chile  Chile 
China  China 
Cayman Island  Cayman Island 
Germany Germany  
Denmark Denmark  
Spain Spain  
Finland Finland  
France France  
United Kingdom United Kingdom  
Greece Greece  
Hong Kong  Hong Kong   
Indonesia  Indonesia 
India  India 
Ireland Ireland  
Israel Israel  
Italy Italy  
Japan Japan  
Korea Korea  
Mexico  Mexico 
Malaysia  Malaysia 
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TABLE 10 (Continued) 
Country Classification 
 
Panel B: Country partition based on country’s level of economic development 
Country Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Netherlands Netherlands  
Norway Norway  
New Zealand New Zealand  
Pakistan  Pakistan 
Philippines  Philippines 
Poland  Poland 
Portugal Portugal  
Singapore Singapore  
Sweden Sweden  
Thailand  Thailand 
Turkey  Turkey 
Taiwan  Taiwan   
United States United States  
South Africa  South Africa 
N=41 N=26 N=15 
 
Note: Sample countries are partitioned based on International Monetary Fund, advanced economy list. 
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